MORO STRUGGLE for FREEDOM and KALIMATULLAH in the BANGSAMORO HOMELAND!

It is now over half a century since the issue of autonomy has become a part of the yearly pre-occupation of the Government Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), nevertheless, the Moro people’s fundamental right for freedom, sovereignty and independence has never been achieved. The Moro people, historically, separate and distinct from the Filipino nation, remain perpetually in chain, attached helplessly and mercilessly to the apron string of the Philippine government. This clearly shows that the MNLF signing of the 1974 Kuala Lumpur Resolution, accepting autonomy, placed the Moro people in a trap –- keeping in storage their struggle for total liberation. For all its good virtues, the 1974 Kuala Lumpur Resolution has derailed the MNLF from the correct path to freedom and independence.

For many centuries, the Moro people were a free, sovereign and independent nation. But owing to the centuries of turmoil wrought by endless waves of foreign conspiracy and aggressions, the Moro people lost their freedom. Consequently, people other than themselves are exercising the Moro people’s sovereignty. Indeed, by the 4th of July 1946, the Moro homeland was annexed and gobbled up by the newly formed and newly independent Republic of the Philippines. Since then and in vindication of our people’s right to freedom, sovereignty and independence, the Moro people were embroiled in a never-ending war for total liberation. The word “secession” is a misnomer and cannot be applied to the Moro people’s struggle because it is a just and legitimate struggle for total liberation based on the fundamental principles of independence of non-governing people of nations of the world. The MNLF struggle should have been the paramount fulfillment of the total liberation of the Moro homeland had it not accepted autonomy.

Indeed, at the present moment only the MNLF remains faithful and steadfast in upholding the OIC Resolutions and the 1996 GRP-MNLF-OIC Final Peace Agreement. Even the Philippine government does not exude any sign of sincerity and seriousness in complying with the Peace Accord in letter and spirit. Otherwise why the prolonged delay. A half century of dilly-dallying on the part of the government from President Marcos to Macapagal-Arroyo, should be enough eye-opener to the MNLF. While the cause of freedom and independence tends to unite all of the Moro people under one single banner as happened in the beginning of the MNLF struggle, autonomy, on the other hand, creates dissension and division and disunity and weakness among the Moro people. Perhaps, autonomy is much more difficult to achieve than independence.

The MNLF has given more than enough chances to the Philippine government to demonstrate its sincere commitment to uphold and implement the agreement in letter and spirit, however, all the MNLF got are alibis and downright lies, let alone the “character demolition” of the MNLF leadership, not only from the government but also the Philippine media and government officials.

The dissatisfaction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the implementation of the 1996 GRP-MNLF-OIC Final Peace Agreement can no longer be hidden under any cloak of goodwill.

Nearly half century of waiting for the implementation of genuine autonomy, which should be founded on the mutual approval of GRP and MNLF, has made weary and disgruntled the overwhelming majority of MNLF forces, communities, supporters and sympathizers. It is not a far-fetched scenario that time will come when some MNLF cannot contain their disappointment.

The MNLF, even at the risk of alienating its people struggling for independence, silenced their guns and uphold peace for over ten (10) years now. All it asks is for the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to fulfill its part of the bargain, without evasion, deceit or procrastination.

It seems that in the arena of this 1996 GRP-MNLF-OIC Final Peace Agreement, we are not actually at peace with our partner but still at war performing the “battle of the wits”.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) had shown utmost sincerity in upholding the Peace Covenants, this being manifested by silencing our guns, even to the extent of our partner’s continuous genocidal attacks in our camps and communities.

Yet, for fourteen long years, we still exert much effort in finding ways and means to negotiate peacefully, solutions to the major violations of our partner, the GRP.

However, we wish to reiterate, that all negotiations have their limits and this kind of situation cannot go on forever. There will always come a time that we in the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) have to choose an option that will not, never again, chain our people to oppression.

An option, that will ultimately lead our people to regain our inherent rights and freedom as one moro nation…

TOTAL LIBERATION OF THE BANGSAMORO PEOPLE IN THIS HOMELAND!

A. Broken Pieces of Dreams (Post Agreement scenario)

The 1996 Final Peace Agreement was the third of it’s kind: first, the December 23, 1976 Tripoli Agreement; second, the least heralded Jeddah Accord signed in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in April 1987; third, the now 1996 GRP-MNLF-OIC Final Peace Agreement signed September 2, 1996 in Malacanang Palace, Philippines, except that this agreement was to flesh up the mother agreement that the MNLF signed under the aegis of the defunct Quadripartite Ministerial Committee in Tripoli, Libya in December 23, 1976. Recalling the Quadripartite Ministerial Committee was enlarged into what is now the Ministerial Committee of the Eight at the outset of this latest phase in the GRP-MNLF-OIC peace process.

In the wake of the signing of this latest Peace Agreement, people were animated and exuberant in their enthusiasm to welcome and support it. Except for a few, everyone thought that indeed that long-sought-after peace was just around the corner; and with that peace, a floodgate of economic activities and development and rehabilitation would follow. Lo! What a rosy picture it was that was dangled before the Moro people’s eyes. Who would not be mesmerized by what one heard coming repeatedly to one’s eagerly receptive ears, like an endless repertoire of sweet melodious songs. Even the MNLF leadership, were taken in and literally swept off their feet. In three years’ time, at the end of the three-year transitional period of mechanism, all the vestiges of the long and disastrous war, result of nearly three solid decades of mindless bloodletting, the MNLF were swept away. What with pledges by the tens of billions of pesos to be earmarked for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Who would not pander to the spectre of a “Mini-Marshall Plan of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation,” akin in some ways to the great spectacle that came at the end of the Second World War in Europe? Everyone was coming in throngs to picture a beautiful and attractive scenario to dazzle the Moro people’s eyes and ears.

So optimistic, indeed, was the air that no less than the Peace Prize Committee of the Felix Houphoet Boigny-UNESCO, in awarding the 1997 Nobel Peace prize to President Fidel Ramos and MNLF Chairman Prof. Nur Misuari, was expressing its hope that the 1996 GRP-MNLF-OIC Final Peace Agreement would set as a model for other revolutionary movements to emulate and follow.

The MNLF Chairman Prof Nur Misuari was very enthusiastic that peace between the MNLF Bangsamoro Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of the Philippines has been achieved and put in place. That is because, the MNLF have been faithful and fastidious in upholding and implementing their treaty commitment, for the sake of peace. The integration of the MNLF combatants to AFP and PNP has been successfully on the move and the MNLF Chairman instructed all the other combatants in the 14 provinces and ten cities to prepare for the formation of the so-called “Regional Internal Security Forces (RISF).”

The 1996 Peace Agreement provides that the Regional Internal Security Forces (RISF) shall be formed and based as it is in rural areas, including the lush forest and mountainous regions of Mindanao and its islands, to complement and support the peace and order efforts of the AFP and PNP. Together or separately, they will strengthen and sustain the momentum of peace in the Bangsamoro homeland.

The MNLF Chairman even went to the extent of meeting the MILF Chairman, to work out a mechanism or a joint coordinating body, to prevent possible recrudescence of animosity and armed clashes between the two Mujahideen forces, either individually or organizationally. They also agreed in principle to join hands or separately to prevent recurrence of fighting or war in any part of the Bangsamoro homeland, in order to ensure the safety of the Bangsamoro people and others from any danger of their lives, honour and property.

Further, so overwhelmed was the MNLF Chairman, that the great exquisite beauty of this homeland and its white sandy beaches, coupled with its excellent climate almost throughout the year, reinforced by the vast, teeming and seemingly inexhaustible aquatic and mineral and agricultural resources, much of which remain basically still untapped up to these days, would make the Moro homeland at once compelling and irresistible indeed –both to tourists and investors worldwide. And this could easily enable the Moro people to overcome the devastating effect of the long war; and in a short period of time enable them to catch up and even outstrip other nations of the world economically. This way the Moro people can plant the seeds of a durable and lasting peace in the Moro homeland, thereby ensuring the success of the Peace Agreement for themselves and for their posterity.

What a wonderful future the MNLF Chairman had envisioned for his people and homeland. Too late for him to realize it all became broken pieces of a dream.

B. Unfulfilled Promises

The prospects, however, is not as encouraging let alone as bright. All because of the flawed and erratic implementation of the Peace Agreement. As there has been unnecessary dilly-dallying with the development funds, thereby procrastinating and delaying the development and rehabilitation program to uncertain date in the future. Thus, nothing meaningful and visible that can touch the life of the Moro people and society have transpired since the MNLF embarked on their governance and supervision of the autonomous region and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development for nearly three years. Even such highly laudable program like the anti-poverty program of the government has not been adequately funded, let alone sustained.

Although some of the MNLF have derived modest benefits from foreign donors i.e. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Bank Social Fund, USA-Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program (ELAP), Canadian International Development Assistance (CIDA), Japanese International Cooperation Assistance (JICA), United Nations Population Fund, ADB Adult Literacy Program, the Belgian, the Australian, the German and other foreign-funded humanitarian assistance, all of these are in the forms of stop-gap measures and incidental to the socio-economic obligations created by the 1996 Final Peace Agreements and imposed unequivocally on the contracting parties, particularly, the Philippine Government. Hence, they’ll encompass only so much number of clienteles among depressed people victims of the untold consequences and devastation of the war. Besides, they’ll carry on their activities only while the program lasts; and this depends solely on the mood and temperament of the donor organizations or countries.

The entry of the foreign assistance did not play a dramatic role in the rehabilitation of post-conflict communities. This was caused by the practice of foreign donor agencies to spend so much on consultancy fees and salaries of personnel majority are non-Muslims from Metro Manila and Visayas. The MNLF acknowledge the “bail out” role of foreign donor communities in the implementation of the socio-economic aspect of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, however, it has been noted that it has only negatively contributed to widening the wealth gap between Muslims and Christians in the ARMM. Further, the unequal distribution of projects by foreign donors among the communities of the MNLF and the Moro people caused disagreements in the ground and worst of all, the foreign donors utilized and exploit the Moro people as their “handyman for free.”

Two analysts at the RAND Graduate School based in Sta. Monica, California, writing for the Summer 2002 edition of the RAND Review (page 24), has this to state:

“A negative example is the Southern Philippines, where social and economic aid totaled only $6.00 per person per year over a period of five years. This meager sum helps to explain the dismal failure of most of the development policies instituted in Mindanao to inhibit support for terrorism. Compounding the situation, most of the money was channeled to Christian-populated areas, merely exacerbating the already existing wealth differentials between Christian and Muslim communities. The combined effect has been to nurture and, in certain cases, intensify support for local insurgent and terrorist groups.”

The flow of funds and financial assistance both local and international could hardly be accounted for, that is, while the national government and foreign donor states flood the newspapers and radio media outlets of funds downpour into the area, the Bangsamoro homeland and people could hardly see where such downpours occur.

It has been observed that the GRP Report on the Implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) has been suffused with heavy details of projects so as to create the impression that a beehive of socio-economic activities has been unleashed in Mindanao. However, the larger picture of the economic and social conditions of the Moros belies what these details of projects hope to create in the minds of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

The truth is: the bulk of downpours of funds claimed by the national government did not pass through the administrative hands of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

Until now, the so-called Mini Marshall Plan for Mindanao is not yet realized and the approach remains to be on a piecemeal basis. Undisputable poverty continues to be the unfortunate lot of the majority in spite of these projects.

Because of the paucity and limitation in the benefits that the Peace Agreement has wrought, the MNLF only have thus far succeeded in sowing the seeds of rancor and demoralization in the hearts and consciousness of the Moro people, especially, the MNLF rank and file. Instead of the much-vaunted progress and development that have been vociferously promised the people to mobilize their full support behind the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, all that the Moro people have so far got during much of the ten years has been an endless throng of unfulfilled promises, apart from the foreign charities and handouts and the anti-poverty program that has since been discontinued for lack of funds.

Serious as this failure to comply with the economic and financial components of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement may be, but worse off still have been the violation in the sphere of political commitments and obligations.

Time and again, the MNLF have stressed the need for a trilateral (GRP-MNLF-OIC) consultation especially in the political aspect. Ironically, even at the occasional pleading of the OIC, the GRP has proceeded unilaterally in interpreting and executing its obligations under the FPA. A case in point, and something which move backward the pace of the FPA, was the August 14, 2001 Plebiscite called by the GRP for the purpose of ratifying Republic Act of 9054, or “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Muslim Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act 6734, Entitled “An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao”, As Amended.”

On this score, the November 24, 2001 letter of the OIC Secretary General to the Chairman of the OIC Ministerial Committee of Eight did not fail to observe that:

“The Government of the Republic of the Philippines has unilaterally fixed a time-table to conduct a plebiscite in the Autonomous Region in the Southern Philippines August 14.It also unilaterally set the date of November 25 next without taking account of the resolutions of Islamic Conferences appealing to the Government of the Philippines not to unilaterally conduct the plebiscite and to extend the deadline for the elections of the Autonomous Region in 2003.”

The ratification of RA 9054, even at the expressed opposition of the MNLF and OIC, is pregnant with negative implications. With it, the GRP is claiming that it is the amendatory law contemplated in the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. As with usual electoral processes in the Philippines, the people of the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) were made to ratify a very important law without them understanding its contents. As we always say, the merit of autonomy is always defeated by the tyranny of numbers. Uninformed and prejudiced people are forced to accept or reject something they do not understand at all. The GRP is to be blamed for the consequences of RA 9054 because even the law provided for massive information dissemination prior to a plebiscite, but which it has miserably failed to do.

All constitutional and democratic processes, which the peace agreement is noted for, are marred with questionable political maneuvers and horse-trades. The plebiscite of August 14, 2001, which “ratified” Republic Act 9054 and decided for the additional areas that favored autonomy, was advertised only for three (3) days absent of any substantial participation of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) leaders who were then in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The Bangsamoro people were not sufficiently apprised of the pros and cons of the issue. It was compounded by the notorious performance of the electoral commission acting all the time at the instance and command of Malacanang.

RA 9054 is also replete with provisions that run counter to the intent and text of the FPA. The new law either omitted or modified important provisions explicitly written in the 1996 FPA. For instance, Item No. 2, paragraph b of FPA provides that:

“The new area of autonomy shall then be determined by the provinces and cities that will vote/choose to join the said autonomy. It may be provided by the Congress in a law that clusters of contiguous Muslim-dominated municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged and constituted into a new province(s) which shall become part of the new autonomous region.”

It took the Philippine Congress 5 years to enact the self-styled amendatory law which was agreed to be passed within two years from the establishment of the then Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), the implementing mechanism for Phase I of the FPA. As such, there is no assurance that a law for the clustering of Muslim-dominated municipalities will be given priority by a snail-paced Congress. The makers of RA 9054 did not take the chance, wittingly or unwittingly, to incorporate such vital provision.

The ensuing elections of Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) officials on November 2001 and May 2005 showed how the filths of Philippine politics threaten the very political culture of the Bangsamoro people. What Malacanang wants, Malacanang gets.

At the outset, and by the look of events that unfolded in our midst all is well that ends well. But no, not to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the very struggle they fought for decades.

While a peace agreement is in place, its terms and conditions are waywardly implemented, at least, to one who is keen at looking at things more objectively. How could there be peace when the very players involved in the process have already been deceived, emasculated –--nowhere to be found now?

It baffles now every normal mind to see Mujahideens hardly allowed to share and partake of its blessings as against those who from out of the blues are taking command and propelling the wheels of their destiny as a people. For ten (10) years after said agreement had been forged, their lives and that of their communities experience no change for the better; in fact, worse.

One will find now a Mujahid who spent the prime of his life fighting for decades, looking for back-up patron (patronage politics) just to land a job in the autonomous government. Even the few appointed MNLF officials to key positions could hardly pass for confirmation by the commission on appointments composed mostly of non-fighters but permanently occupying professional and affluent status in the community.

And this unbreakable misery cannot be well presented in the circles of power in the national government because Muslim representation does not emanate from genuine stakeholders. Appointees to national positions are usually made without the expressed consent of the MNLF Leadership as contained in the GRP. Upon meticulous examination of the Muslims in the echelons of government including ARMM, majority are traditional politicians and has long been in government even before the signing of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA).

In the field of justice, the Shari’ah Courts are still weak administratively as only one (1) District Court is created with the remaining four District Courts still vacant. In the Shari’ah Circuit Courts, only 19 judges have been appointed while 32 positions are still unfilled inspite of the big number of Muslims who passed the Shari’ah Bar Exams.

Lastly, but definitely not the least of issues, the integration of MNLF combatants in to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) calls remedial actions. The separate unit for the MNLF Integrees has not been created since 1996 and while the position of Deputy Commander for Separate Units was created, it is purely ministerial and symbolic. Being loosely deployed, these MNLF Integrees are now being used in combat operations against other Muslim groups. This practice runs counter to the 1996 FPA and may only rekindle deep-seated resentment against the military and police.

Unfortunately, however, the Bangsamoro people have yet to see the dawn of economic prosperity and political stability the peace accord had vowed to fulfill.

A. Stalemate (The Negotiation)

Two struggles had the MNLF entered into: first, the armed struggle; second, the parliamentary struggle. Both have different forms of battle used, the former performing the “battle of arms”, the latter a negotiating table using the “battle of wits”. In the armed struggle, the MNLF won the war. However, in times of cessation of hostilities or what we call “temporary peace”, the MNLF, unexpectedly, made its biggest blunder because the enemies outwitted them.

Reminiscing the past, what are the enemy’s objectives when they agreed to resolve war in a round table? Is it really peace the enemies want to achieve or merely used it as a weapon to gain time to accumulate resources and consolidate power for the next round of battles?

Negotiation does not always happen between the two warring parties. Its occurrence is contingent on the concrete realities recognized by both sides and their willingness to undertake it. The government can refuse a peace deal if it can beat the other side on the battlefield. However, it can be over-eager to negotiate, if the other party indicates a weakness that can be exploited over the negotiation table, or can be tricked into capitulation. The government can also use negotiation as a weapon to miss-represent itself as the just and reasonable side, to sow intrigue in the ranks of the rebels and to fool the people.

War is costly, while the negotiation is cheap. A day in war is usually costlier than a month of talking. In negotiation, there are no lives lost, properties destroyed or people rendered homeless. And as the negotiation drags on, the status quo of disengagement or non-engagement is given more and more a sense of reality and the hope of becoming permanent.

In many instances, it is true that talking is better than not talking at all. But talking as if the whole peace process revolves around it only validates the charge that negotiation is mere exercise in futility. It is not meant to reach anything lofty. It is an end in itself.

However, a sincere quest for peace – a just and lasting one – through negotiation, is a different story. It is a slow process and has no or few shortcuts. Its soul is the identification of the root causes of conflict and its primary objective is to carry out an urgent agenda of change by the agreeing parties that would resolve the problems underlying the conflict.

However, there is little reason to doubt that when the government agreed to sit down with the MNLF to talk, it was resorting to the time-tested tactic: when hard=pressed, negotiate. The grand design of the MNLF to carve an empire known as the Bangsa Moro Republik was high on its agenda. Fighting was raging everywhere and a sizeable portion of Mindanao and Sulu was in rebel hands. The government also knew that peace achieved by violence will not last and represented only a part of the solution to the rebellion.

B. Islamic Countries On the Move for MNLF

International support for the MNLF cause started as early as the late 1960s when reports of Muslim massacres hit world headlines. The first to react openly was Col. Muammar Ghaddafi, President of Libya, who said that his government would come to the rescue of the Muslim Moros in Mindanao and Sulu if the mass killings of his brethren did not stop. He was not alone in expressing such serious concern. Many other Muslim leaders in Asia and Africa shared the same sentiments. The worldwide reactions pushed the Philippines and the Marcos regime into a precarious position, because many of these states did not need the Philippines as much as this country needed them. Many of these states were producers of oil, which the Philippines needed very much. Consequently, Marcos began to look for scapegoats. He accused foreign agents of blowing up the conflict out of proportion.

The first foreign leader, at the state level, to extend concrete help to the Muslim Moros was Tun Datu Mustapha, Chief Minister of Sabah. There were many reasons why he came to the rescue of the Muslims. One of these was his biological, emotional and historical connection with the Muslim Moros of Mindanao and Sulu. His mother was a Tausog and therefore he was much of a Moro as the rest of his brethren. He allowed Sabah to be used as training camp, supply depot, communication center and sanctuary.

Tun Datu Mustapha Haron’s stance and later also that of Kuala Lumpur –Sabah is part of the Federation of Malaysia – was a major irritant between the two neighbors. The Philippines had a long-standing claim over Sabah that at one time almost led to open warfare. Sabah came to be regarded by the Philippine as part of her territory on the strength of the ownership claim of the ancient Sulu Sultanate.

Kuala Lumpur never admitted aiding the Muslim Moros. The official position of Malaysia regarding the Mindanao crisis was confined only to actively supporting resolutions passed by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

In 1971, Libyan President Muammar Ghaddafi openly declared his support for the Muslim Moros, who were apparently the object of a genocide campaign. In the same year, Libyan Foreign Minister Saleh Bouyasser came to the Philippines with a US $1 million pledge of his government to bankroll the on-going guerilla training of 300 Muslim Moro recruits in Malaysia. A year later, when Martial Law was declared, Libyan money, weapons and other materials started to flow into the frontlines in Mindanao and Sulu.

In May 1971, the Organization of Islamic Conference was founded. One of its aims, as set clearly in its Charter, is to strengthen the struggle of all Muslim people to safeguard their dignity, independence and national rights. It so happened that Tunku Abdul Rahman, the founding father and first Prime Minister of Malaysia became the first Secretary General of the powerful pan-Islamic body. As head of the OIC, he was instrumental in the support extended to the Muslim Moros by the OIC member states especially Libya and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

From February 29 to March 4, 1972, the third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, passed a resolution calling for the review of the plight of the Muslims living in the Philippines, especially in Mindanao and Sulu.

On March 24-26, 1973, the Fourth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting in Benghazi, Libya, expressed deep concern over the reported repression and mass extermination of Muslims in South Philippines and decided to send a delegation of Foreign Ministers from Libya, Senegal, Somalia and Saudi Arabia. The Conference also created a voluntary fund from member-states to help the Muslims in South Philippines. If further passed a resolution requesting Indonesia and Malaysia to exert their good offices, within the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to help find a solution to the problem.

In August of the same year, the four-nation delegation visited Mindanao and Sulu. Members of the delegation were Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Omar Al-Shakaff, Libyan Foreign Minister Abdulati Al-Obeidi, Somalian Foreign Minister Arteh Ghalib and Senegal Ambassador to Egypt Moustapha Cisse. The fact-finding mission took note of the steps taken by the Philippines to improve the condition of the Muslims. These steps however were considered insufficient to solve the whole problem, as reflected in the resolution of the succeeding meeting of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Kuala Lumpur the following year.

On March 9-13, 1974, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Omar Al-Shakaff again visited the Philippines in a bid to follow up earlier efforts to monitor the condition of the Muslim Moros. President Marcos told him that the government was doing everything to attend to the needs of the Muslim Moro communities which included the setting aside of wide tracts of land for resettlement.

On May 29, 1974, President Marcos and President Suharto met at Menado, North Sulawesi, Indonesia to discuss among other vital ASEAN concerns, the Muslim Moro rebellion. But unlike Malaysia and Libya, Indonesia was more concerned with regional unity, as expressed in the ASEAN, of which both Malaysia and the Philippines were members.

On June 21-25, 1974, the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The conference called upon the Philippine government to desist from all measures, which may result in the killing of Muslims and the destruction of their properties and places of worship in Southern Philippines. It urged the government to find a political and peaceful solution through negotiation with Muslim leaders, particularly, with the representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front, in order to arrive at a just solution to the plight of the Filipino Muslims, within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines. It also created a welfare agency, known as Filipino Muslim Welfare and Relief Agency, for the purpose of extending welfare and relief aid directly to Muslims in the Southern Philippines.

C. Rounding Up The Table for Initial Talks

On the basis of Resolution No. 18 approved in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, follow-up efforts to bring the two warring parties to the negotiating table rose high on the OIC agenda. At the invitation of the Philippine government, Dr. Mohammad Hassan Al-Tohamy, the new OIC Secretary General, visited the Philippines to discuss matters in connection with the resolution. He succeeded in bringing the MNLF and the Philippine government to the negotiating table in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on January 18-19, 1975. The MNLF formally abandoned the pursuit of independence, in favor of a strong autonomous region with internal security forces.

The GRP and MNLF panels met in the presence of the OIC Secretary General. The talks, however, did not materialize because both sides presented demands that could not be met by either side. The MNLF panel was composed of Nur Misuari, MNLF Chairman; Salamat Hashim, MNLF Deputy Chairman; Abdulbaki Abubakar, Hamid Lukman and Abdulrasad Asani. On the government side was Executive Secretary, Alejandro Melchor, who headed the government panel. The members were Rear Admiral Romulo Espaldon, Ambassador Liningding Pangandaman, Col. Jose Almonte and four others.

The aborted talks, after further consultations, were re-scheduled to take place on April 7, 1975. It did not take place, because President Marcos instead called a dialogue In Zamboanga City from April 17 to June 30, 1975. Those he invited to this dialogue were handpicked by the President among the Muslim leaders, government officials and rebels, who are among those who rejected the nine-point agenda proposed by the OIC Quadripartite Ministerial Committee for the resumption of the stalled negotiation.

The Sixth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference convened in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on July 12-15, 1975. The conference approved the nine-point proposal for the resumption of talks and urged both the MNLF and the Philippine government to resume the negotiation, as early as possible.

On May 6, 1976, Dr. Karim Gaye of Senegal, the new OIC Secretary General, met President Marcos in Nairobi, Kenya. The OIC Chief told the President of the need for the resumption of the talks between the MNLF and the Philippine government.

A week later, on May 13-16, 1976 the Seventh Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference held session in Istanbul, Turkey. As usual, the conference reiterated its call for the immediate resumption of the talks between the MNLF and the Philippine government.

On October 1, 1976, the Islamic solidarity Fund donated US $1 million to the Agency for Development and Welfare of the Muslim in the Philippines. However, this fund was coursed through the Philippine government, which had the discretion over the manner of disbursement and programming.

D. Ink on Paper (The Clown’s Betrayal)

In the meantime, Imelda Marcos, the first lady of President Marcos, was designated Special Envoy of her husband. This brought her to Egypt, Algeria, New York, Saudi Arabia and then to Libya. At the United Nations, she had an occasion to discuss the Mindanao crisis with Algerian Foreign Minister Abdul Aziz Bouteflika, then President of the UN General Assembly and through him with the Arab delegates to the world body. From there, she proceeded to Tripoli, Libya where she had a lengthy dialogue with President Muammar Ghaddafi on the Mindanao crisis.

On December 15-23, 1976, the second round of negotiation between the MNLF and the Philippine government took place in Tripoli, Libya. The talks were conducted in the presence of the Quadripartite Ministerial Committee. Dr. Ali Treki, the Libyan Foreign Minister, presided over the series of meetings between the two panels, which culminated in the signing of the covenant now known as the Tripoli Agreement of December 23, 1976. The agreement provided for the establishment of autonomy for thirteen specified provinces and nine cities in Mindanao and Sulu.

Undersecretary Carmelo Barbero chaired the government panel, with the following as members: Liningding Pangandaman, Simeon Datumanong, Karim Sidri, Pacifico Castro and Col. Eduardo Ermita. The MNLF panel again was composed of Nur Misuari, Salamat Hashim, Abdulbaki Abubakar and Abdulrasad Asani. Also with the group, as legal counsels, were Atty. Zacaria Candao and Atty. Pangalian Balindong of Lanao del Sur.

Subsequently a formal ceasefire agreement between the two warring parties was signed on January 20, 1977. A committee was organized, composed of the MNLF, the Philippine government and the Quadripartite Committee to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire. Provincial ceasefire committees were also set up in the thirteen provinces to help monitor and maintain the observance of the accord.

The philosophy behind the declaration of a ceasefire is simple. Heads must cool off, shooting must stop before the talking can proceed. It is only in an atmosphere of understanding and serenity that the search for real peace can proceed.

The ceasefire agreement was generally holding during the early months of 1977, but it collapsed completely towards the end of the year when the government troops mounted massive offensives against all known MNLF strongholds. Even the mutually agreed bivouac areas in Mindanao, as earlier depicted, were also attacked almost simultaneously.

The Tripoli Agreement was lacking in sufficient detail and therefore the two panels agreed to meet first in Libya, from February 9 to March 3, 1977 and then in Manila from April 21 to 30, 1977 to finalize it. However, on both occasions, they bogged down owing to the over emphasis on the side issues, rather than on the substantive points, by representatives of the Philippine government.

The meeting in Libya first stalemated and then bogged down. The two panels simply could not agree on the degree of autonomy to be handed to the Moros and the definite role the MNLF had to play in it. More time had been expended on the side issues than on the substantive points. National Defense Undersecretary Carmelo Barbero, head of the GRP panel even brought up the issue of a plebiscite, which was nowhere to be located in the entire text of the agreement.

Again the First Lady was sent to Libya to thresh out matters with President Muammar Ghaddafi. The result was the exchange of cables between President Marcos and President Ghaddafi on March 17-18. The communiqué contained their consensus on the declaration of autonomy, a provisional government, and the holding of a referendum or “consultation”.

The meeting in Manila, like the first, was tense. There was a heated discussion between the Philippine panel and representatives of the Quadripartite Committee, particularly Dr. Ali Treki.

The talks failed, as had been predicted right at the outset. Firstly, President Marcos hastily went to Japan in an obvious attempt to escape any role in a negotiation he may have maneuvered towards collapse. Secondly, the Philippine delegation was engaging in too many questions over technicalities, virtually reducing the talks into a grammar class. Even a single article like “the” or “of” sent the Philippine side – composed mostly of ministers like Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile – to gang up on and lock horns with the OIC representatives. And thirdly, as in the first negotiation in Tripoli, Libya, the Philippine panel showed its bad faith and sinister attempt to obstruct the path to peace in Mindanao.

E. Again Another Betrayal

Capitalizing on the stalled negotiations, which later degenerated into a “no-peace all-war” situation, President Marcos unleashed a multi-faceted, multi-pronged counter insurgency program, which was implemented at an exceptionally rapid pace. Militarization continued to increase and identified MNLF areas were flooded with bloodthirsty military regulars and irregulars. Under the veneer of his socio-economic and infrastructure agenda, he built roads, bridges, dikes and ports, dredged rivers and canals, reclaimed marshes, etc. With his land reform program, he further dispossessed the Muslim Moros of their remaining landholdings. New waves of emigrants from the North, at government expense, kept pouring in, which resulted in the creation of fresh settlements and colonies.

One may be led to believe that all these programs were executed in the names of peace, security and progress. But in reality they were in the nature of “sugar-coated” bullets. All were intended to defeat the MNLF, deny it of its favorable natural sanctuaries and to penetrate into the “hearts and minds” of the people.

The government’s unusual interests in “promoting” Islam and the study of the Arabic language did not fail to intrigue inquisitive minds. These culminated in the creation of the so-called Ministry of Muslim Affairs. A similar approach was instituted during the American colonial regime in the Philippines. The study of the Holy Qur’an was introduced, obviously as part of their pacification campaign. Thousands of Moro kids, as a result, filled schoolhouses.

The hypocritical bid to promote Islam cannot be discerned unless one viewed this as part of the wide-ranging counter insurgency scheme of the government. This country is strictly secular. The church and state are separated. Both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions – also the 1987 Charter – explicitly prohibit the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities from promoting, assisting or uplifting any one religion in the Philippines, directly or indirectly.

The appointment of erstwhile Rear Admiral Romulo Espaldon as head of this Ministry of Muslim Affairs was offensive to the Muslims of this country. During his stint with the SOUTHCOM, the Admiral’s hands had dripped with much Moro blood. He renounced Catholicism – or was made to renounce it – in order to qualify for the job, as being a Muslim was obviously its first criterion. Was there no full-blooded Muslim at the time that could fit the job squarely?

The air of optimism that greeted the diplomatic breakthrough in Tripoli, Libya, at the signing of the agreement was but analgesic. Even after the lapse of almost a decade since the signing on December 23, 1976 and the subsequent ouster of Marcos on February 25, 1986, many eyebrows were still being raised in wonder whether Marcos was really sincere or had merely played a cat-and-mouse game. However, those who had a commanding grasp of the Philippine history—especially that segment which is focused on the interludes of peace negotiations and true agreements --- simply view the Tripoli Agreement as another Kiram-Bates Treaty of 1899. That treaty was signed between Sultan Jamalul Kiram II of the Sulu Sultanate and Brig. Gen. John C. Bates, representing the United States. The Sultan signed the treaty in the firm belief that it signaled the safety of the homeland and the explulsion of the American colonialist. The Americans had a different motive in mind. They made use of the treaty to usher in eventual occupation of the Moro country.

A close scrutiny of the circumstances leading to the conclusion of both agreements would reveal striking similarities. As pointed out earlier, the Kiram-Bates Treaty was chiefly used by the Americans to prevent the opening of another battlefront in Mindanao and Sulu while they were battling the forces of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo in Luzon. It was indeed a matter of temporary exigency that this treaty was conceived. Eight decades later, history seemed to have repeated itself. The pre-1977 period was really a precarious one for the Marcos regime.

Metropolitan Manila, the state nerve center, was becoming vulnerable to communist forces because most of the AFP combat forces were deployed in Mindanao and Sulu. The years of confrontations in the South allowed the Communist New people’s Army (NPA) to grow in size and strength. In fact, NPA forces were already scoring many remarkable victories in many areas in the north. And for some time the island of Samar in the Visayas was practically a liberated area. This was why some army contingents were shipped back to Luzon and the Visayas immediately after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement.

Until the last moment of the American regime in the Philippines, the Kiram-Bates Treaty was no more than a scrap of paper. It was not recognized or observed faithfully by the Americans. The case of the Tripoli Agreement was no much different. Up to the disgrace of Present Marcos in early 1986, the agreement was just a “scrap of paper.” One Mindanao leader, Reuben Canoy, who figured prominently in the move for the island to secede from the Philippines, observed:

… The Tripoli Agreement was soon reduced to a mere scrap of paper. Perhaps this was bound to, for like most diplomatic documents the pact was couched in imprecise language liable to all sorts of miss-interpretation by the signatories.

The Eight Foreign Ministers Conference convened in Tripoli, Libya on May 16-22, 1977. A historic decision was passed granting special observer status to the MNLF, an action clearly conveying additional political clout in dealing with the Philippine government. The conference also held the government solely responsible for the failure of the negotiations in Tripoli, Libya in February 1977 and in Manila in April 1977.

The republic of Senegal hosted the Ninth Foreign Ministers Conference at its capital, Dhakar, on April 24-28, 1978. Hence the OIC denounced the Philippines for the massacres committed against the Muslim Moros and for reneging on her international obligations to honor the Tripoli Agreement. The Conference also called upon both parties to come to a ceasefire and resume negotiations.

After a year, on May 8-12, 1979, the tenth Islamic Conference for Foreign Ministers assembled in Fez, Kingdom of Morocco. Again the OIC called on the government to implement the agreement.

In February 1980, the new OIC Secretary General, Habib Chatti, paid a visit to Manila to bring up the issue once again. But again, the government reacted negatively on the issue.

Sometime in 1981, Indonesia, the most populous Muslim state, offered her good offices as an “honest broker” to arbitrate the conflict or at least to restart the stalled negotiations. There was no concrete reply.

On March 21-23, 1982, Saudi Arabia tried to give the precarious peace another lease on life. The late King Khaled Ibn Saud personally brought up the case with President Marcos during his visit to the Kingdom. But, smart as ever, the latter placated his host by assuring him that autonomy was already in place in Mindanao and Sulu.

Then came the big bang in 1983. Former Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. was shot dead on the tarmac of the Manila International Airport on August 21. Aquino was their bitterest political rival. No one person or group had a greater motive to execute the assassination.

Thenceforth, the Moro issue was relegated to the sidelines. The Marcoses were busy shielding themselves against the backlash of the assassination.

The years 1985 came and went. They glided away almost unnoticed as far as the Mindanao problem was concerned. President Marcos was not only holding on to power by a hairline; he was also very ill, extremely ill.

Then another big bang occurred. The dynasty came to an end. President Marcos was ousted from power on February 26,1986. The widow of the slain Senator, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino, was installed President of the Philippines, not on the basis of the 1935 or 1973 Constitution, but through the EDSA People Power Revolution. As a revolutionary government – at least of the right, center, and right-of-center – it functioned without a regular constitution for about a year.

In the meantime, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Muslim World League (MWL), both based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, were undertaking efforts the resume of the MNLF talks with the new administration of Pres. Corazon Aquino.

But in a surprise move, President Aquino, setting aside protocol and security concerns, met with MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari in Maimbung, Sulu, on September 5, 1986. This so-called historic meeting resulted in an agreement to cease hostilities and lay the groundwork for formal negotiations. One writer commented on this meeting:

All of a sudden, after the EDSA revolution in 1986, the new Administration, deliriously overjoyed by its victory, brought back Nur Misuari like a hero. Nur Misuari came back with him full with rising expectations of triumph. He brought back with him a more complicated package of the problems in Mindanao to ensure that victory would be theirs.

Meeting in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the GRP and MNLF panels forged an agreement, now known as the Jeddah Accord, on January 3, 1987. The two sides agreed to continue discussion of the proposal for the grant of full autonomy to Mindanao and Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan. It was further agreed that substantive talks would be held in the Philippines.

On February 9-20, 1987, the GRP-MNLF-OIC Peace Talks proceeded in Manila and Zamboanga City, respectively. It became apparent, even at the outset that the talks would collapse due to fundamental differences in the proposals submitted by both panels. The MNLF wanted full autonomy for the 23 provinces in Mindanao, on the ground that the government had already agreed to its as mentioned in the Jeddah Accord. The government, on the other hand, refused to toe this line, because the Tripoli Agreement only speaks of 13 provinces and 9 cities.

After the breakdown of the talks, the government proceeded to devise the necessary processes to implement the so-called mandate in the 1987 Constitutions to grant autonomy to Muslim Mindanao. Accordingly, in October 1987, President Aquino started to lay the groundwork for the creation of the Mindanao Regional Consultative Commission (MRCC), which was tasked by Congress to assist in drafting an organic act intended for an autonomous Muslim Mindanao.

On the other hand, MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari, bitterly criticizing the creation of the MRCC, once again renewed his bid for full MNLF membership with the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Observer status had been conferred on the MNLF on May 1977.

On October 3-5, 1992, the first round of exploratory talks between the MNLF and the government was again held in Tripoli, Libya. The response of the MNLF on this was positive.

The second round of GRP-MNLF Exploratory Talks was convened in Cipanas, West Java, Indonesia on October 2-4, 1992 to finalize the agenda of the proposed formal negotiations.

From October 25, 1992 to November 7, 1993, the First Round of Formal Negotiations between the MNLF and the GRP began in Jakarta, Indonesia. An Interim Ceasefire Agreement was inked between both parties. The MNLF and GRP also signed a Memorandum of Agreement providing for the reactivation of the Mixed Committee, creation of five support committees:

1-National Defense and Security;

2-Education;

3-Economic and Financial System, Mines and Minerals;

4-Administrative System, Right of Representation and Participation in the National Government, and in all Organs of the State;

5-Shari’ah and Judiciary, Ad-Hoc Working Groups and other matters.

On December 20, 1993, the First Mixed Committee Meeting was held in Jolo, Sulu. It was followed in Zamboanga City on April 6-7, 1994; the third was in Jakarta, Indonesia on August 31, 1994; the fourth in Zamboanga City on January 29-31, 1995; the fifth in Davao City on June 19-23, 1995; the sixth in General Santos City on July 26-28, 1995; the seventh in Zamboanga City on March 1-2, 1995; the eight in Davao City on June 21-23, 1996; and the ninth in Jakarta, Indonesia on August 30, 1996.

The Second Round of Formal Talks between the MNLF and GRP was held in Jakarta, Indonesia on September 1-5, 1994. The Third Round of Formal Talks was again held in Jakarta, Indonesia on November 28 to December 2, 1995. An Interim Agreement was signed between the MNLF and the GRP containing the points of consensus reached during the earlier negotiations. Finally, on August 30, 1996, the Fourth Round of Formal Talks was again held in Jakarta, Indonesia, which led to the inking of the MNLF-GRP Final Peace Agreement.

F. Finally, MNLF Chained to Oblivion (Signing the 1996 Final Peace Agreement)

Exactly, 28 years, five months and 15 days of the MNLF struggle for total liberation, the 1996 GRP-MNLF-OIC Final Peace Agreement was culminated in Malacanang Palace, Metro Manila, Philippines by and between the MNLF Chairman, Prof. Nurulaji Misuari and President of the Republic of the Philippines, H.E. Fidel V. Ramos witnessed by the Chairman of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six, H.E. Mr. Ali Alatas and the OIC Secretary General, H.E. Dr. Hamid Al-Gabid.

“Peace at Last” was everybody’s catchphrase. President Ramos said:

“Today we have come closer to becoming that nation of our dreams. Today we not only witness history: We make it. Today with the formal signing of the final peace agreement between the Government Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), we bring to a close almost 30 years of conflict at the cost of more than 120,000 Filipino lives.”

MNLF Chairman Prof. Nur Misuari corroborated this statement by saying:

“We have agreed to end the war and restore peace. This is a very momentous, very historic occasion. This will be written in the golden pages of history.”

While on the other hand, the Chairman of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six, Hon. Ali Alatas, made the following statement:

“It may be worth reiterating that real hard work begins after the signing of the Agreement. For a Peace Agreement, or any other agreement for that matter, does not implement itself: it assumes concrete reality only on accretion of activities completed.”

Following the line of argument, all non-conforming views concerning the final solution to the Mindanao problem are peremptorily rendered wrong, fallacious or simply untenable or utopian. But who sets the standards of evaluation? Who gives authority to evaluate or pass judgment? By whose mutual or common agreement, and for whom? For what and for whom is this prescription intended? Who knows this problem better – the government, the MNLF, the OIC or the people themselves?

After the signing of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, the clock of the day of reckoning has already started ticking.

The Peace Accord has been under scrutiny from day one of its signing until today. Soon history will give its verdict on whether the agreement is the solution or would become part of the Mindanao problem. Another agreement is in the offing: the GRP-MILF Agreement.

The MILF, a splinter group of the MNLF when it started its table negotiation and considered to be the ones who continued the struggle for total liberation, is again following suit the footsteps of the MNLF, signing an agreement.

Again, another agreement, another blunder for the Bangsamoro people. The Bangsamoro people, brave fighters as they are, should have known by now that agreements are only for a while. Freedom is still what is best for Muslims in this homeland south of Philippines.

3. The Moro Struggle against Filipino Government

The Travails of the past and the chilling fears over an uncertain future aroused the Moros to activity. Led by the studentry, professionals and some political leaders, the Moros looked for alternatives that could secure or at least defend the survival of the Moros as a people. The Manila government was to them still a “government of outsiders” and was not only indifferent but, even more so, appeared to be the main force behind a move to “liquidate them,” as revealed in the Jabidah Massacre in 1968 and the series of mass slaughters in Mindanao by the ILAGA- PC tandem in the early 1970s.

The old Moro leaders, nationalists or “collaborators,” had tried to secure Mindanao and Sulu from the control of the outsiders but failed miserably. One major reason for their failure was lip-service they offered to what was generally perceived to be a real and serious problem requiring immediate and concrete action. Evidently, they had become too preoccupied with the present, since most of them were either politician of highly government officials, to refresh the hard lessons of the past and warn of the threats in the offing. Such lackluster mentality must have been the consequence of having made too many compromises. This ultimately led to surrender, or what we may mildly term as “subservience.” In addition, the lure of the world and the inability of these aristocratic leaders most of them belonged to the so-called royal class – to shed off their traditional privileges, must have contributed a lot to this unfortunate frame of mind. As virtual captives of this leadership crisis, the Moro people apparently could only had become unproductive and uncreative, and thence, generally passive, if not indolent – almost like the indios of the past Spanish regime.

As the conflict hardened and intensified – against the backdrop of deepening Islamic consciousness – the Moros had to find ways to survive and at the same time to make true their distinct national identity. This necessity found expressions in the rise of the Moro organizations in Manila, organized by the Moro traditional political leaders. Its main objective was the complete establishment of Islam in all aspect of life. However, many eyebrows were raised as to why, during the hard conflict that followed in Mindanao and Sulu, the Moro organizations failed to rise to the occasion when its services were most needed by the Moro people. If there was any organization that evoked much terror in the power circle in Manila, the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) under Cotabato Governor Datu Udtog Matalam in 1968 must have been that organization. But after many rumblings, the MIM itself may have succumbed to the threats and enticements of the government. In December 1971, Pres, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Datu Udtog Matalam met in Manila, after which only the name was left of this organization.

The years from the early second half of the sixties to the early seventies marked the height of the student militant activism and unrest. There was widespread agitation, violence and disturbance, both national and international, which stirred student activism, manifested through the "parliamentary of the streets", demonstrations, rallies, pickets, teach-ins and other forms of radical protest. The Moro students and even the professionals were not remiss in moving space with this world phenomenon.

In the case of the Moro students both in manila and in Cairo, Egypt, there were seven eventual episodes, three foreign and four national, which had the greatest impact upon their lives and the trend of events in Mindanao and Sulu. The three foreign incidents were as follows : 1) the June 5, 1067 Arab- Israeli war; 2) the 1968 aborted but bloody coup attempt in Indonesia; and 3) to a lesser degree, the rise of student demonstration in Indonesia and Malaysia in 1968. And in the national scene, the 1968 Jabidah Massacre easily was the main “eye-opener,” which evoked much disgust that revived the old fears that under Filipino rule the Moros were not safe. It was followed by the founding of the Mindanao Independence Movement ( MIM ) by Datu Udtog Matalam in 1968, the 1970-1971 series of Massacres of Muslims in Mindanao, and finally by the declaration of martial Law in 1972. All these incidents were highly momentous circumstances that no rational persons, lest of all a Moro, could ignore and abandon altogether to chance.

Initially, the studentry, professionals and, to some extend, the Moro politicians were locked in debate over what course of action to pursue for the Moros, as a whole, to survive. There were three options before them :

1) adopt a collaborationist line, as did most of the old nationalist leaders;

2) assume a risk-less but dishonorable stance of acquiescence and leave the rest to “fate,” and

3) subscribe to the view that man, as the ‘best of creations,” has the relative capability to make or unmake his own destiny. All the three options student activism, especially in Manila, but were mostly nowhere to be found when the sailing got rough in Mindanao and Sulu.

Those who picked option No. 3 generally assumed supporting roles in the “parliamentary of the streets,” but became the ones who personally led the revolutionary war later. Takers of No. 2 were the slaves of the insatiable self and remained in the cities; many married Christians and raised their families outside the moral realm of Islam.

In the language of the day, the “aroused” students or professionals were branded “activists” or “radicals” and were more likely declared “subversives.” Despite the so-called policy of maximum tolerance issued as orders to anti-riot policemen and Metrocom soldiers, not a few Moro student activists were injured during rallies and demonstrations. Cases in point were the violent demonstrations against the visit of Israel Foreign Minister Abba Eban in 1967 and the coming of Gen. Abdul Harris Nasution of Indonesia in 1968. The demonstrations protested against the Israel Foreign Minister and the pro-Israel policy of the Marcos regime. Some of the demonstrators managed to barge into the Israeli Embassy in Makati and pulled the Israel flag down.

The Confrontation in 1968 was not pre-planned. The Moro students were set to welcome General Abdul Harris Nasution, the man who was highly regarded as the successor to President Ahmad Soekarno. While the Moro students were at the Manila International Airport waiting for General Nasution to disembark, another group of militant students identified with the pro-communist Kabataang Makabayan ( KM) protested his visit and the started hurling invectives, such as “ Nasution: Butcher of Indonesia, “ US puppet, go home!” and other stinging insults. Consequently, the pro-Nasution and the anti –Nasution demonstrators clashed, hurling stones, bottles and Molotov bombs that resulted in several injuries on both sides.

In the beginning, both Moro and Christian students jointly denounced the prevalent evils of the day. They organized demonstrations against the prevailing political and economic frustrations of the people, the widespread graft and corruption, elitism in the social and political structure, and so forth. Gradually, however, the Moro activists began to realize, albeit quite late, that although there were common serious national issues confronting the Moros and Christians that they could both cry about, the fact was that the Moros themselves had their particular issues and demand to liberate the Bangsamoro people. They, therefore, started to speak of the issues of the Moros, in particular, how they would fare in a predominantly Christians State, what would be their destiny under the Filipino Flag, should they have to work for reforms within the realm of national politics, etc.

It was not long after that many Moro student organizations began to sprout in metropolitan manila, the nerve- center of the student activism. Some of these organizations were the Union of Islamic Forces and Organization ( UIFO ) under student leader and later lawyer Macapanton Abbas Jr.; The Muslim Progress Movement ( MPM) led by Dr. Alunan C, Glang; the Philippine Muslim Nationalist League ( PMNL) spearhead by UP Instructor Prof. Nur Misuari; the students Supreme Council of the Philippines; the Muslim Students Association of the Philippines ( MUSAPHIL); the Muslim Lawyers League; the Muslim Youth Assembly; the Bismillah Brotherhood; the Al Muslimin Fraternity; and the Sulu Muslim League Students in the provinces also formed organizations, two of which were the Mambarul Islam based in Cotabato City and the Sulu Islamic Congress in Jolo, Sulu.

Very soon the disillusionment of these activists came to surface, in early 1970. They were particularly cynical of and disheartened by the continued lip-service of their leaders, both of the traditional and political stripes. In May 1970, the Moro Youth activists convened the first Muslim Youth Assembly in Zamboanga City, where they denounced the evils of the day. They exhibited an anti-government posture and called on the Moro Youths to take the lead of the struggle.

Overseas, the Moro students in Cairo and Egypt despite being detached from their homeland by thousands of miles were also organized themselves and form an organization, initially in response to their basic requirements as students. This later developed into a vehicle for bringing forth to the international forum the sad plight of the Moro People in South of Philippines (Bangsamoro Homeland). In 1962, the Philippine Students Union (PSU) was formed in Cairo and Egypt by UZ. Salamat Hashim of Cotabato and Uz. Abdulbaki Abubakar of Sulu, Mahid Mutilan of Lanao, Ibrahim Abdulrahman and Khalifa Nando, also of Cotabato.

On several occasions, the PSU staged rallies to denounce the persecution of the Moros back home. Their presence in what was considered the most influential Arab capital under the able leadership pf President Jamal Abdul Nasser, as well as their proximity to other Muslim capitals in the Middle East and Africa, was conducive to the forging of contacts with other Muslims also working for their emancipation. Such contacts, especially with the Palestinians, buttressed in no small way their early revolutionary inclination and motivation. These contacts facilitated the support from many Muslims states and leaders.

2. The Moro Struggle against the American Invaders

When the Americans first appeared in the northern horizon in 1898, the Filipino revolution was in full swing. As a young and emerging world power, the United States had to find excuse to realize her vast interests in Cuba, which was then under Spain. The sinking of the American warship Maine at Havana Harbor on February 15, 1898 resulting in the death of 246 men provided the US government the necessary pretext to declare war on Spain on February 25, 1898. In due course Admiral George Dewey was ordered to proceed to Manila to attack the Spanish squadron under Admiral Patricio Montojo. This was the May 1, 1898 “Battle of Manila Bay” pitting a modern navy versus veritable leaking tubs. With the Filipino revolutionaries allied with the Americans, the former won victory after victory against the Spanish forces until on June 12, 1898, after the last Spanish soldier had surrendered, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, unmindful of or notwithstanding the American mind set, proceeded to declare Philippine Independence at Kawit, Cavite.

If Aguinaldo did not really misread the American intention, but deliberately played a calculated game, then he had blundered. The Americans never had the slightest intention of recognizing his declaration of independence. As a matter of fact, American troops began to occupy strategic areas vacated or surrendered to them by the retreating Spaniards, to the exclusion of the Filipino revolutionaries. As soon as they had gained enough strategic grounds, the Americans intentionally provoked the Filipinos into a shooting war which set-off the start of the Filipino-American War.

At the outset. The Filipinos were made to believe that the Americans came to help to liberate their lands from the Spaniards, after which they would become an independent nation. Untrue to their words, the Americans did not really come to liberate the Philippines for the Filipinos but to acquire a colony in the furtherance of their own imperialist scheme.

In the meantime, in the interval between the Spanish evacuation of the Philippines and the arrival of American troops in Mindanao and Sulu, anarchy ruled. Moro warriors began to attack the Spanish garrisons in Cotabato, Zamboanga, Sulu and Lanao and sometimes wiped out the defenders to the last man.

In Cotabato, Moro warriors began to assault the Spanish garrisons in Pikit, Reina Regente, Tumbao, Cotabato and Tamontaka. One by one, they captured these garrisons. Leading the Moros were Datu Utto, Datu Piang (Amai Mingka), former minister of Datu Utto, Datu Ali Bayao, Piang’s son-in-law and Rajahmuda of Salunayan; Datu Ampatuan or Bapa in Mangacop and Datu Inok or Amani Giday.

These datus, all of the Buayan dynasty, were conspiring to reassert their supremacy over the region vacated by the Spaniards. The plot was to overthrow the Filipinos who had grabbed power to side with Kaitpuneros. Eventually this situation led to the fighting along Paseo de Villaeron in Cotabato on January 6, 1899, resulting in the killing of Roman Vilo, Esteban Ortouste, and a few others.

As in Cotabato, chaos also reigned in Zamboanga after the last Spaniards left. The organization of the council that handled the affairs of the district also disintegrated. The church at Zamboanga was ransacked. People complained of widespread robbery and destruction of property. Pro-Katipuneros and those who were not distrusted one another. A known Filipino revolutionary, Melanio Calixto, was murdered by a pro-American named Isidro Midel. Fighting soon flared up between the Filipino insurgents and followers of Datu Mandi, easily the most powerful chief in the district.

The upheaval in Sulu, although not as extensive was even worse. The Spanish garrisons suffered terribly and many were decimated to the last soldier like what happened in the garrison at Tataan in Tawi-Tawi. Harassments were also severe in the other islands like Bongao and Siasi. The Moro warriors were clearing every island of Spanish troops except in Jolo where the Spanish have a strong garrison.

In Lanao, a similar scenario was unfolding although in a lesser scale. Spanish garrisons especially in Marahui were in a state of siege and sporadic attacks and ambuscades became the rule. As a matter of fact, these garrisons were among the first to be evacuated to escape the wrath of the lake Moros.

The Americans claimed that they had a mandate in coming to Mindanao and Sulu. But who gave this mandate? Was this an offshoot of the so-called mandate that justified or made to justify their colonization of the Philippines? Again, who gave this right to fight the Spaniards, rob the Filipinos of their right to self-rule and consequently dispossess the Moros of their homeland? From God, the ultimate source of morality form the American people in keeping the Western democracy the source of authority to rule from the American capitalists who actually control the “stomachs” of the majority and ergo their heads or simply from the naked greed and avarice of President William Mckinley?

Pres. William McKinley after contemplating what to do with the Philippines told a group of Protestant clergymen at the White House in November 1899:

"I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not shamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night.

And one night late it came to me this way – don’t know how it was but it came …That we could not give them back to Spain – that would be cowardly and dishonorable…"

Was this the mandate – and was it from God? Why did President McKinley “kneel” before his God only after the destruction of the Spanish armada in Manila and not before he gave the order to Admiral Dewey to attack Manila?

In the early years of his life, President McKinley had attended seminary in a small town in his native Ohio and this might explain his “pietism” and afterward his “pious imperialism”. It is a strange coincidence, however, that all colonizing powers rationalized their expansionist policies by calling to the “gods” or by citing “ethnocentric missions.” France was also fulfilling her mission civilisatrice when she laid siege on her Indochinese colonies.

In his policy speech to the U.S. Congress in 1899, Pres. William McKinley succinctly expressed:

"The Philippines are not ours to exploit, but to develop, to civilize to educate to train in the science of self-government. This is the path we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust committed to us."

Again, the cloak of “benevolence” and the “white man’s burden” were central to this policy. But for twenty years or so, even after the grant of independence, the Americans still enjoyed the economic parity rights under the Laurel-Langley Agreement, which was only terminated on July 4, 1974.

Let us go back to what had transpired before the final decision to acquire the Philippines as a colony was made and examine how the maneuvering in the American capital progressed. It is said that for a full six months, debates on what to do with the Philippines had been going on in Washington. The choice was whether to grant it immediate self-rule or to make it a colony. In the end, a compromise was sealed. The imperialist Republicans and the so-called anti-imperialist Democrats met halfway, and the result was to colonize the Philippines but grant her self-rule at the “earliest feasible time”. This pledge took the United States forty eight years to fulfill on July 4, 1946 when Philippine independence was granted.

If there was indeed a mandate – from the god of President McKinley and from the politician-capitalists, this would have applied only to the Filipinas, then comprising only Luzon and the Visayas. The territory of the Moros or “Moroland” should have been excluded. As the facts of history showed, Mindanao and Sulu had always been a foreign territory, for Spain had never really acquired these islands either by conquest, purchase or any other means. Her sovereignty was never enforced, except inside the confines of her garrisons and fortifications. How on earth could a nation sell a territory she never owned or conquered? One renowned writer, Dr. Onofre Corpuz, had this to say on this point:

"By the time treaty negotiators were parleying in Paris there was no longer any vestige of Spanish control, possession or government in Filipinas (that is to say, the Christian part of the archipelago). And Spain never had control, government, nor possession of the Moro territory. It did not have any “suspended sovereignty” because its sovereignty had been terminated."

On the eve of the signing of the Kiram-Bates Agreement, there were three hard postulates that were molesting the minds of the Americans. First, there were still 34,000 armed Moros in the Moro country and the various islands were in such a dangerous condition that no place could be safe for outsiders. The swish of the kris, said an American author, Victor Hurley, was unrestrained. Second, the American occupation forces had a hard time containing the onslaught of the Filipino revolutionaries led by Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo when the Filipino-American War flared up in Luzon and some parts of the Visayas. The Americans feared any strategical or tactical tie-up between the northern insurgents and the southern (Moro) warriors. Such an eventuality would have been too hot to handle, even for the best of the American generals. And third, even President McKinley had entertained serious skepticism on the sovereignty of Spain over the Moro country, particularly the Sulu sultanate.

The negotiation with the Sulu sultan was not an easy task for the Americans. The American negotiators had to use earnest and tactful diplomacy in order not to antagonize the sultan, who was expecting the surrender of the Spanish garrisons to them not to the Americans. The Sultan was skeptical how the Americans had any claim over his realm which was never conquered by the Spaniards. For over a month, unnerving bargaining and using a “gunboat diplomacy”, the Sultan gave the Americans a proposal which is unacceptable to the latter.

However, after thorough discussion of the proposal with thirteen articles, it was signed in two versions: English and Moro (Tausug). The agreement embodied provisions on issues of sovereignty, non-interference of religion, curbing of piracy and grant of pension to the sultan and his top aides.

On April 9, 1900 General Bates informed the Sulu sultan that the agreement was confirmed by the President of the United States except for Article X regarding the practice of slavery. For its part, the US congress did not ratify the agreement on the irrelevant pretext that the Sulu monarch and his people were polygamous.

However, in the course of time, disputes arose over the interpretations of the provisions of the treaty especially on the aspect of “sovereignty“. The English and Moro versions differed significantly with each other. The Americans insisted that sovereignty was recognized and established in Sulu but the native version did not clearly state so, except as an affirmation in vague generalities of close friendship with America for mutual benefit, with the grant of special privileges and rights by the sultan to the Americans. On the side of the sultan, the use of the term “sovereignty” was not only alien to the Moro political terminology but was “complex” and “intricate” that he failed to appreciate the far-reaching implications of its western connotation. On the other, the Americans may have deliberately left it that way as part of their ruse to buy time and enough reason to abrogate it later. It is so perplexing to note why there were no mutual efforts, by the Americans in particular, to the effect that in case the two versions are in conflict, which of the two shall prevail.

Hereunder are the comparisons of both versions and it can be noted that although the Americans and Moros are sincere to abide by the terms of the agreement, one version runs counter with the other.

Article in the English versions states:

The sovereignty of the United States over the whole archipelago of Jolo, and its dependencies is declared and acknowledged.

On the contrary, the Moro version (translated) provides:

The support, the aid, and the protection of the Sulu Island and archipelago are in the American nation.

One can notice the discrepancies of the two versions. The native version does not mention any recognition of American sovereignty. It merely establishes the obligation of the Americans to support, aid, and protect Sulu in reciprocation to the special privileges extended to them by the sultan.

In Article III of the English version, it says:

The rights and the dignities of His Highness the Sultan and datos shall be fully respected; The Moros shall not be interfered with on account of their religions; all their religious customs shall be respected’ and no one shall be persecuted on account of his religion.

The same article in the Moro version is as follows:

The rank of the Sultan of Sulu and the Datus shall be fully respected by the Americans. They shall not interfere with the affairs of the Mohammedans’ or with their customs; more especially the religion of the Sulus, they shall not change.

Take note of the technicality in the clause “no one shall be persecuted on account of his religion” in the American version. This is an implied authority of disguised sovereignty. In the native version, there is no implied sovereignty but, rather, it states clearly the intact rights and prestige of the sultan and datus.

On the issue of slavery, Article X of the English version states:

Any slave in the archipelago shall have the right to purchase his freedom by paying to the master the usual market value.

In the native version. It runs thus:

In case a slave refuses to return to his master and desires to purchase his freedom it would be right for him to pay the proper value.

The American version treats slavery as absolutely evil and made it mandatory on the master to free his slave and give his liberty after the slave has paid a corresponding value. In the Moro version, both the practice of slavery and the freedom of slaves are conditional.

Because of the contrary meanings and connotations on the two versions, the treaty was rejected and the American occupation of Sulu.

As previously stated, the presence of the Americans in Mindanao and Sulu was a direct challenge to the independence and authority of the still “unconquered” Moros, with an estimate number of 335,000 during those times. The Americans moved for integration was met with hostile confrontation by the Moros because they viewed it as the white man’s renewed attempt to subjugate and Christianize the Moros even if they had to go to war, as their forebears had done for many centuries.

Since the Moros perceived the threat seriously and they were trained not to bow down in shame, the Americans had to decide whether they should back out or dare continue forward with their attempt. There are two struggles of the Moros against Americans during their regime: the armed struggle and the parliamentary struggle. The parliamentary struggle was explained well in the American colonialism. Hereunder will be discussed extensively the Moro armed struggle against the Americans.

The armed struggle of the Moros against the Americans was ignited by the following reasons:

First, by the Moros repudiation against foreign encroachment;

Second, the Americans total disregard of the policy of non-interference wherein the Moros could not accept being commanded by outsiders;

Third, the two conflicting world of realities wherein the Americans are called by the Moros “infidels”, “secularists” and “invaders” while the Americans called the Moros “fanatics” and “pirates” which became one source of early conflicts because they considered each as threats;

Fourth, the Moros opposed the different activities performed by the Americans such as land surveys, census, curtailment of slavery and disarmament.

In summation, the Moros wanted to preserve their independence and sovereignty over their lands from foreign interference the reason why they bravely opposed the Americans.

On May 1899, despite the Kiram-Bates Treaty, hostilities erupted in Mindanao and Sulu. This was due to the assertiveness of the next-level chiefs to intervene because the sultan is very tolerant to the dictates of the Americans. What follows next was a serious military confrontation in various areas of Mindanao and Sulu.

One American writer, J. Ralston Hayden commented that never during the entire continental expansion of the United States had armed encounters been frequent and serious as that between the Moros and American troops. The Moros bold display of heroism, bravery and determination, even against formidable odds, spoke of their undying spirits to fight for their religion, people and land. The living legacy to this was the invention of the 1911 .45 caliber revolver which was specially designed to stop the juramentado dead on his track.

Earlier, American soldiers used the .38 caliber revolver as sidearm but, although it was effective against the Cubans, it was not sufficient against the Moro warriors who could still lunge at their adversaries with their kris and inflict casualties. The extent of the ferocity of combat and the distraught condition of the American occupation forces was reflected by one of their most favorite expressions: “The only good Moro is a dead Moro.” No less than 20,000 Moros were killed in action from 1899 to 1916. From 1904 to the end of General Wood’s term as Governor of the Moro Province in 1906, the Moros suffered 3,000 dead as against 70 Americans.

On April 1902, a large-scale engagement occurred between 1,200 American troops and 600 warriors of the sultan of Bayang and nearby settlements. The Moros were encamped in their cottas (forts) with brass canons emplacements. For the first time, the Americans taste the horrors of on-rushing juramentados who simply refused to fall after being hit repeatedly. The fighting protracted until May 3, 1902 where the US troops suffered 10 dead and 41 wounded against 300-400 Moros slain including the sultans of Bayang and Pandapatan.

Later, Capt. John Pershing was appointed the new commanding officer of the camp who was nicknamed “Black Jack”. He immediately started to implement plans for the eventual recognition of US sovereignty over the Moros of Lake Lanao, however, this was interpreted by the Moros as an act to subjugate and convert them to Christianity.

The Moros warned the Americans to leave immediately or face dire consequences. A series of bitter engagements followed that lasted up to February 1908. So beleaguered were the Americans that in Dansalan (Marawi) they could not cross Keithley Road without being shot at. At one time, District Governor Allan Gard, the first civilian Governor of Lanao was wounded in an ambush at Maciu on February 1908. But due to the vast resources, superior weaponry and battle tactics of the Americans, these engagements were won by the newcomers with 30 Americans dead compared to 300 Moro casualties.

Leading the Lanao resistance was the shrewd and brave Datu Ampuan Agaus who outwitted the Americans several times and despite his many reversals, was still up in arms until the middle of 1916.

In Cotabato, the most celebrated anti-American resistance was spearheaded by Datu Ali Bayao, Rajahmuda of Salunayan and later of Buayan and his brother Jambangan. Datu Ali was supposed to succeed Sultan Anwaruddin Utto as chief of the Buayan sultanate but for some reasons Datu Piang or Tuya Tan, his father-in-law, had become the most popular chieftain in Cotabato when the Americans arrived in December 1899. Mingka, the daughter of Datu Piang, was however married to Datu Ali, who was raising the flag of resistance against the cedula tax and anti-slavery campaign of the Americans. Datu Ali’s bravery and determination became known far and wide. He did not only succeed raising the flag of resistance over the entire Cotabato Valley but also attempted to persuade the Lanao Moros to join hands with him in fighting the Americans.

In early March 1904, General Wood personally led the attack on Datu Ali’s main cotta at Kudarangan which according to one account, was the largest ever constructed and could garrison 4,000-5,000 men and was defended by 85 pieces of artillery, including one of 3-51/2 inches caliber. After heavy clashes, the fort was captured and Datu Ali and 260 followers retreated to Salunayan.

In May 1904, Datu Ali had even the score with the Americans, who were lost because they were not familiar with the terrain of the marshland and the terrible bites of mosquitoes. In his diary General Wood recorded their experienced with mosquitoes:

“I don’t think anywhere in the world have I ever seen mosquitoes as thick as they were at this place. The men were almost crazy. There were countless millions of mosquitoes so thick it was impossible to protect oneself against them, or sleep. Some wrapped their hands in blankets and others sat over the fire until the smoke so hurt their eyes and nostrils that they had to get away, and as soon as they left the fire the mosquitoes attacked them. I think two nights here would have destroyed the efficiency of the command and probably resulted in several cases of temporary madness."

In a classic example of guerrilla tactics, Ali and his men succeeded in luring the American troops into the Liguasan Marsh where a well-laid ambush led to the massacre of nineteen soldiers, including two officers, and the capture of several others. The captives were later released.

Finally on October 22, 1905, Capt. Frank R. McCoy led an expedition of combined army and scouts of the 22nd Infantry and Philippine Scouts under cover of darkness and sneaked deep into Datu Ali’s hideout near Malala River not far from Buluan to surprise him and his men. Datu Ali and scores of others perished in this attack. What made the mission easier was the treachery of Datu Inok or Amani Giday, husband of Bagungan, who tipped off the Americans on Datu Ali’s hideout. Earlier, Bagungan was abducted by Datu Ali, which enraged the husband and made him turn against his former companion in the resistance.

Even before 1903, a series of confrontations raged in the Sulu archipelago. The most serious were those led by Panglima Hassan in alliance with many minor datus in October of that year. Panglima Hassan was of humble origin but he was gifted with intelligence and determination. He was so influential that he could easily muster 500 warriors within hours notice and many more within days. The Americans accused him of slavery and banditry, the normal crimes imputed to other anti-American campaigners elsewhere in Mindanao and Sulu.

Eventually Panglima Hassan, already fed up with the Americans hostile ways, decided to confront the Americans anew. With about 400 followers, including women and children, he assaulted the American troops stationed in Jolo. The fighting lasted the whole day resulting in heavy casualties on both sides, especially to the attackers. By then reinforcements under the command of General Wood arrived in Sulu. Soon the Americans mounted counter-offensives. The main fort of Panglima Hassan near a lake was besieged from all directions and a gory hand-to-hand fight followed. After days of continuous fighting, the fort was overran, Hassan overwhelmed and captured. But after a masterly stroke of genius, Hassan escaped, leaving behind many casualties among his captors, including Maj. Hugh Scott, who was wounded.

The struggle of Panglima Hassan was short-lived. On March 4, 1904, he was martyred at his hideout atop Bud Bagsak. But the Americans found in him a ferocious fighter who never hesitated to throw himself into battle, even against a superior enemy. After his martyrdom, his followers led by Datu Pala continued the resistance until November 1905 and declared a jihad to drive out the infidel Americans.

Many more resistance fighters came forward. One was the famous Jikiri, known as the “terror of the Sulu Sea”. He was branded by the Americans as a “bandit” and was considered as “Robin Hood” of the Moros because he slashed the throats of the Americans and their local lackeys and gets their properties and distributes them to the people and his men.

Like Panglima Hassan, Jikiri had a lowly beginning. He once served the Sulu sultan as a betel-nut bearer. Early in his rebel life, he had a small band of followers of just seven, but in due time this grew in size. In 1907, his fame as a “pirate” began to cause much trouble to the Americans in Sulu, then under Governor Alexander Rogers, who soon raised the reward money to P4, 000 to get him “dead or alive”. Jikiri was not only brave; he was elusive to his pursuers and lusted to hit back at them with rage and impunity. He was particularly a terror to the pearling rights grabbers; in fact, they were the main reason for his resistance. No less than Sultan Jamalul Kiram II, on his visit to Washington in September 1910, told Pres. William Taft that Jikiri’s banditry was due to the violation of the traditional rights of the people over the pearl beds of Sulu.

After two years of hit-and-run confrontations, the end of the road for Jikiri came on July 4, 1909. A combined American cavalry, infantry and artillery force assaulted his cave at Patian Island, ten miles from Jolo, where he and his men perished after a fierce hand-to-hand fight.

In August 1913, the Moros of Talipao on Jolo Island refused to pay the road tax imposed on them by the Americans. Led by Datu Sabtal, they fortified themselves around the slopes of Mount Talipao. Their refusal led to a series of engagements between the group of Datu Sabtal and the Philippine Scouts.

In 1914, Datu Alamada Macog or Amani Boliok of Pedatan, near Parang, defied the Americans. With a following of 3,000 men, women and children and possibly even more, the slippery Moro chieftain fought many engagements with the Philippine Scouts and Constabulary troops. In his many skirmishes with Captain Allen Fletcher, the commanding officer of the American outfit, Alamada was always on his feet and on the run. His feats were very colorful in the beginning, but Moro culture would not give credit to those who bowed down in shame by surrendering to the enemy. Datu Alamada Macog surrendered to the Americans on May 19, 1914.

As can be noted, serious armed confrontations with the Americans continued after 1914. Datu Ampuan Agaus was still fighting the Americans up to 1916. Military operations failed to break up his determined effort to fight colonial rule.

In 1923, armed confrontation exploded in Tugaya, Lanao when a group of Moros revolted against forced education imposed upon their children, who were compelled to attend American schools, which they suspected to be an instrument of conversion to Christianity. The resistance was cut short upon the death of the leader and 54 of his followers in the series of armed engagements that followed.

The same year, Datu Santiago and some Constabulary deserters who joined him created much unrest in the Parang region of Cotabato. Resorting to hit-and-run fighting, Datu Santiago and his men were able to inflict considerable casualties on pursuing government troops, now already under Filipino leadership. Like any resistance leader, Datu Santiago could not understand why he had to pay the cedula tax for staying in his own ancestral place. He was also bitter about forced education and the excesses of the Constabulary troops. Fighting in very favorable terrain, he was able to hold out until 1925, when a fierce encounter took place resulting in the loss of several hundreds of his followers. Unable to sustain the resistance indefinitely, he finally surrendered to the government.

Again, trouble erupted in Sulu in 1927, Datu Tahil, a veteran of the Bud Bagsak incident, where he lost his wife and child, refortified the hills of Patikul. After many encounters that started in January and claimed the lives of forty of his men and after a brief escape, he decided to make peace with the government even against the wishes of his clan. This angered even his own sister “who wished him death.”

In the meantime, the Philippine Commonwealth Government was established on November 15, 1935 with Manuel L. Quezon as the first President. Barely six months after, in June 1936, the most serious armed rebellion took place in Lanao. It was spearheaded by Hadji Abdulhamid Bongabong, a religious leader of Unayan, Lanao. The fighting lasted for many years and took place around the lake, where a chain of Moro cottas was erected in defiance. This is recorded in history as the great “cotta fights.” The grievances were contained in a petition letter addressed to the President of the United States. Succinctly put, the issues raised were:

1. Moros had become second class citizens;

2. The Moro Province be segregated once independence is given to the Filipinos;

3. Acquisitions of lands in the Moro Province be reserved for the Moros; and

4. Islam must not be curtailed in any manner.

The uprising lasted up to 1941, just a few months before the invasion by the Japanese Imperial Army.

The listing of the names of Moro resistance leaders and their engagements with the occupation forces, first against the Americans and then against the Filipinos, cannot be made complete here. What we have is just the tip of the iceberg, so to speak. One fact of history is that even after the exit of Spain, hardly months or a year passed without one Moro leader or another taking the field to resist whoever was in power.

But a great many passed into oblivion and their exploits have not been properly recorded, if they were not, in fact, systematically omitted or ignored. Even the greatest, like Panglima Hassan, Datu Ali Bayao, Datu Ampuan Agaus, and Jikiri, whose names are classics in Moro History, had been villainously blackened by the Americans and their puppets, because these Moro heroes had been regarded as the villains. They have ceased to exist now, yes! As for their legacy of struggle, it is still very much within us; and certainly, others will pick up the flag of resistance exactly where they had halted, as thousands upon thousands now are marching forward, following their footsteps, until final victory shall be achieved!

1. The Moro Struggle against Spanish Invaders

There are two points that need clarification as we discuss the struggle of the Moro people against the Spanish invaders: one, on 1570 the “Moros” referred to by the Spaniards were the Muslim inhabitants of “Selurong”, now called Metro Manila, including the nearby towns; two, the first battle of the Moro against Spaniards was fought in the island of Mactan where Rajah Lapulapu killed Magellan on 1521 then followed by the battle right in the heart of Metro Manila.

Selurong (Manila) was ruled by Rajah Sulaiman Mahmud and Rajah Matanda and Tondo was under Rajah Lakandula. All these Rajahs were of Bornean origin and closely related to the sultan of Brunei.

The fall of Granada in 1492 was the last time the Muslims and Spaniards have their battle. Both are simmering with anger since then. Both have a big score to settle. The Spaniards hated the Muslims for their rule of Spain for 800 years. On the other hand, the Muslims could not condone the Spaniard’s massacre of more than 3,000,000 Muslims when they recaptured Spain. With the entry of Spanish troops led by Captain Martin de Goiti to Manila, reckoning has begun. Rajah Sulaiman leading the Muslim defenders made his stand clear:

“We wish to be friends of all nations. But they must understand that we cannot tolerate any abuse. On the contrary, we will repay with death the least thing that touches our honor.”

This was the first foreign policy declaration by a Muslim chief against an alien power. True to his words, Rajah Sulaiman preferred martyrdom than to submit to the Spaniards during the famous Battle of Bangkusay off Tondo’s shore on June 3, 1571. Rajah Sulaiman died a martyr, but the memory of what he did remained, thus, the famous Islamic slogan “Victory or Martyrdom.”

The fall of Manila led to the defeat of all resistance in Luzon and Visayas except those fought in Mindoro on 1574 and the so-called Magat Salamat Conspiracy on 1587. For a span of eleven years, the Spaniards became the new ruler of the entire Luzon and Visayas which lasted for 327 years. On 1571, all the Muslim natives were converted to Christianity and the two islands formally became the Spanish Empire, dubbed the “New Spain”, with Manila as the colony’s capital.

Afterwards, the next task were to secure the new territory from external threat and to push further their colonial designs which was to acquire gold and monopolize the “spice trade” formerly dominated by the Muslims. Because of too much greed to monopolize and control the “spice trade”, Spain marshaled the largest expedition ever on 1578 to attack the Brunei Sultanate, believing that it was in alliance with the Portuguese and it lay within Spain’s sphere of influence. They defeated the Sultanate, albeit temporarily.

After the defeat of the Brunei sultanate, the Spaniards began to focus its greedy eyes on the Sulu Sultanate which they again suspected to be in alliance of the Brunei sultanate. Unknown to them, the Sulu sultanate and the Brunei Sultans are related by series of intermarriages. That same year, Spain prepared a large expedition under the command of Captain Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa to attack Sulu. The attack was resisted by the reigning sultan of Sulu, Sultan Buddiman Pangiran. This was the first virtual declaration of war by Spain against the Moros of Mindanao and Sulu which was to drag on and remain undecided for 320 long years even until the Spaniards were ejected by the Americans in 1898.

The Spaniards war against the Moros was to subdue “pagan people”, to curb piracy, to stop the Moros from establishing alliances with European powers and to forestall the entry of rivals into their “spice trade”. On the other hand, the Moros war against Spain was in defense of their people, their homeland and their religion Islam.

On June 1578, Governor General Francisco de Sande gave orders to Captain Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa and instructed him the following:

“You shall order them (Moros) that there be not among them anymore preachers of the doctrines of Mahoma (Muhammad) since it is evil and false and that of the Christian alone is good.

And because we have been in these islands so short a time, the lord of Bindanao has been deceived by the preachers of Borney, and the people have become Moros. You shall tell that our object is that he be converted to Christianity; and that he must allow us freely to preach the law of the Christian, and the natives must be allowed to go to hear the preaching and be converted, without receiving harm from the chiefs.

And you shall try to ascertain who are the preachers of the sect of Mahoma, and shall burn or destroy the house where that accursed doctrine has been preached, and you shall see that it be not rebuilt.

On January 15, 1579, Governor General Francisco de Sande gave the same orders to Captain Gabriel de Rivera who was ordered to establish contact with the chief of Pulangi (River) in Maguindanao.

Meanwhile, the Spanish government in Manila adopted an official policy to permanently colonize Mindanao and Sulu. The government, for this purpose, signed and agreement with Captain Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, whereby the latter in exchange of the agreement will have enormous benefits and position to be inherited by his son or heir if he succeeds in pacifying the island of Mindanao and establish a colony in Pulangi.

On April 1, 1956, Captain Figueroa sailed for Mindanao with 50 war vessels, 214 Spaniards and 1,500 native allies. They voyage lasted for three weeks until the fleet reached the mouth of Pulangi (Rio Grande de Mindanao) and started cruising upstream till they landed Tampakan where he lined up his troops in preparation for battle saying:

“Soldiers of Felipe! We stand upon the newest soil of Spain. To subdue this dark forest and rid the soil of the infidel Moslem is our aim. They submit as vassals and converts or fall before the Spanish blades. Forward to our duty for King and country”.

The battle began. Rajah Silongan and Datu Ubal leading the Maguindanao warriors and on the other side Captain Figueroa aided by Juan de Lara. However, Captain Figueroa barely had step forward when his head was cleft in two by a Kampilan, a long and straight-edged Moro cutlass, wielded by Datu Ubal. The death of Captain Figueroa demoralized the Spaniards and was defeated while Juan de Lara hurriedly left for Manila to report what happened.

The death of Captain Figueroa spread like a prairie fire in Manila and the Spaniards were so furious. Among those much aggrieved by his death were the Jesuits because they have varied interests in the conquest of Mindanao and they branded the Moros “traitors”.

On 1599, the Moros launched various offensive attacks into the enemies’ territories famously known “the Moro piracy” with the sole purpose of crippling the enemies power base, exact tribute and take advantage of the critical situation faced by Spaniards due to the threat posed by the Dutch.

For a year, the different attacks conducted by the Moros deluged the natives in the different territories held by the Spaniards with fear, despair and anxiety. Tens of thousands prisoners were held by the Moros including valuable possessions like jewelry, precious ornaments, cannons and other materials. The Spaniards realized the high price they have to pay in engaging a bloody venture with the Moros, a retreat at this point in time was too late.

On 1603, a Jesuit priest Melchor Hurtado, was captured by Datu Buisan of Leyte wherein an interesting dialogue took place with him and the other datus of Leyte. Datu Buisan asked the datus if they and their people and all those located in Panay, Mindoro and Batangas had been protected by the Spaniards which they responded negatively. Datu Buisan urged the other datus to joined hands with him so it would be easy to cast off the Spanish yoke. As a result, Datu Buisan and the datus performed a blood compact that made them “ritual brothers.”

On 1627, another raid was led by Sultan Bungsu with a fleet of 30 boats of various sizes and 2,000 men wherein they attacked the Spanish shipyard in Camarines. The garrison was captured and they take possession all its artillery, guns, ammunitions, iron and brass pieces, and 300 prisoners including a Spanish lady named Dona Lucia. After emptying the garrison, they burned it to the ground.

Factors that contributed to the victory of Moros in all their attacks against the Spaniards are the following: first, the Moros are reputedly master sailors and can fight well both in land and high seas; second, the Christian natives under the Spanish-controlled areas are unarmed because of the Spain’s policy prohibiting them to possess any form of arms for fear of natives uprising; third, the Moros are established various bases or rancherias in many places of Luzon and Visayas which they used in attacking nearby coastal towns. These bases are found in Mindoro, Marinduque, Panay, Albay, Sorsogon, Antique, Masbate, Samar, Leyte, Burias, Polillio, and Palawan and in many other islands. In Rio Daraga, Masbate alone, the Moro base of 200 huts had 5,000 warriors and 113 big and small boats.

On 1619, Sultan Dipatuan Muhammad Qudarat ascended the throne of the Maguindanao sultanate. During his reign, he was able to hold at bay the Spaniards for half a century and outlasted eight governor generals. Because of his victory over the Spaniards, the friars described him “thunderbolt of Lucifer”, the scourge of Catholicism and the Atilla of the evangelical ministers. The natives in the Spanish-held territories were ready to do whatever Spain wanted them except “to take up arms against Sultan Qudarat.”Spain considered him as the single greatest obstacle in the efforts to subjugate the whole of Mindanao. Sultan Qudarat’s sphere of power and influence, aside from his traditional dominion over the whole of Cotabato, Lanao, Davao, Misamis, Bukidnon and Zamboanga, was so extensive that he was able to collect tributes from the seafaring inhabitants of the coast of Borneo and some areas of Basilan and the Visayas. During his time, the Maguindanao sultanate achieved its golden age.

In view of this awesome situation in the northern islands caused by the Moros under Sultan Qudarat, the Spanish Crown decided to shift the battle arena to Mindanao. Mindanao was ordered to be pacified at all cost. This was in response to the series of victories inflicted by the Moro raiders. In fewer than thirty years, no less than 20,000 persons were taken captive by the Moro marauders and sold to the markets of Batavia, Ternate, Amboina, Makassar, Java and Madras.

On 1635, the task of pacifying Mindanao fell on Gov. Gen. Hurtado de Corcuera. On March 13, 1637, Corcuera left Zamboanga and landed at Lamitan and immediately started with the assault. He encountered initially minor oppositions, but as he and 800 soldiers kept pressing inland and towards the heavily fortified capital, fighting intensified, causing wanton sacrifice of lives. Sultan Qudarat himself was wounded and was on the verge of capture, but owing to some “magical powers” attributed to him he was able to slip past the ranks of the Spaniards. One of his wives holding an infant, threw herself into a cliff to avoid becoming a captive. Lamitan was razed to the ground. Sultan Qudarat lost eight bronze cannons, 27 lantaka (small brass cannon) and 100 muskets, in addition to heavy casualties including 27 followers whose heads were propped up on spikes.

The brief victory of Spain over Sultan Qudarat became the origin of the Moro-Moro, a blood-and-thunder play in which the Christians always emerged victorious over the Moros. Since that time the play has become an integral part of all Filipino folk and religious festivals. Corcuera became an instant hero and his return to Manila, amidst pompous and colorful preparations, occasioned unending jubilations over the Spanish victory.

The defeat of Qudarat at Lamitan did not weaken his resolve to drive out the Spaniards. To him, this was only temporary and no more than “year’s harvest.” In the meantime, he took refuge at the Lake Lanao region, and it was here that he delivered his most famous speech, exhorting the Maranao datus and sultans to carry on the fight:

“You men of the lake, forgetting your ancient liberty, have submitted to the Castillians. Submission is sheer stupidity.

You cannot realize to what your surrender binds you. You are selling yourselves to toil for the benefit of these foreigners.

Look at the regions that have already submitted to them. Note how abject the state to which their people are reduced is. Behold the condition of the Tagalogs and of the Visayas whose chiefs are trampled upon by the meanest Castillans. If you are no better in spirit than them, then you must expect similar treatment. You, like them, will be obliged to row the galleys. Just as they do, you will have to toil at the ship-building and labor without ceasing on the other public works. You can see for yourselves that you will experience the hardest treatment thus employed.

Be men, let me aid you to resist. All the strength of my sultanate, I promise you, shall be in your defense. What matters if the Castillians at first are successful? That means only the loss of a year’s harvest. Do you think that is too dear a price to pay for liberty?"

The exhortation found its mark and the lake Moros were back into fighting form and, shortly after, they attacked and succeeded in capturing the Spanish fort and set it ablaze. The garrison was evacuated and the Spaniards did not return until after two centuries later.

Barely a year after his victory over Sultan Qudarat, Gov. Gen. Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera led the invasion of Sulu. On January 4, 1638, some 500 Spaniards and 1,000 native allies landed in Sulu. Committed to defend Jolo, the Sulu capital, were warriors who numbered 4,000 including allies from Borneo and Makassar. The confrontation started immediately, and after more than three months pf continued fighting, neither side could claim victory. Both suffered heavy losses. On the side of attackers, five of their finest officers were slain, including an undetermined number of their men. In the end, the conclusion was a negotiated settlement. Sultan Bongsu agreed to the truce, considering the hopeless situation facing his defenders. They were struck by epidemics, possibly cholera or dysentery.

Sultan Qudarat, after a decade, succeeded in 1637 to extend his political sway to almost the whole of Mindanao. This time, even the northern part including Caraga was under his sphere of influence. Sultan Qudarat declared jihad against Spain and invited the rulers of Brunei, Sulu, Ternate and Makassar to unite and join forces with his sultanate in defense of Islam. In response, all succeeding wars with Spain witnessed Borneans, Ternatans, Makassars, and Sulus rallying together for the cause. Thenceforth all expeditions against his sultanate ended in failure. Qudarat died of old age at 90 in 1671.

In the intervening 50 years from 1663, first in the face of the Dutch victories in the Moluccas and the resultant threat to Manila and second, by the corsair Koxinga’s impending invasion threat, the Spanish Crown found it most imperative to consolidate home defense. Spanish troops serving in the various Mindanao garrisons were recalled to Manila. The main fort in Zamboanga was also abandoned. And as a tactical move, they again negotiated treaties with the sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao, obviously to neutralize the Moros while the dangers were still there.

After the twin threats of the Dutch and the Chinese had passed, the Spanish Crown decided to refortify Zamboanga in 1718. Spain also retrieves other garrisons in Mindanao and Sulu to include Labo in Palawan because of the insistence of the Recollects. During their times, the Spaniards adopted a new approach in dealing with the Moros. They showed friendly gestures and abandoned the conversion to Christianity of the Moros provided their missionaries are allowed to stay in their areas and establish commercial partnership. However, the policy they introduced was rejected by the Moros because they do not trust the Spaniards. These resulted to renewed hostilities with more fury and bloodshed.

On 1751, a Royal Decree was passed by Spain known as the “Privateer System” which provided for the encouragement and enlistment of private individuals to organize expeditions against Moros wherein large incentives are attached to it. It stipulated the total extermination of the Moros, razing to the ground all things combustible they owned and the destruction of all their crops and farmlands. All those enlisted were exempted from paying tribute and criminals who enlisted are given unconditional pardon and all are entitled to 4/5 of the war booty. As a result, thousands enlisted for the mercenary expeditions.

The Moros on the other hand, had anticipated this to happen so they toughened their war machines and moved into action. The Moros did not wait for their adversaries to invade their homeland, they launched attacks on the enemies’ territories. This time there were no exceptions. No place, either in Luzon and Visayas, were exempted from the attacks of the Moro raiders: Ilocos, Catanduanes, Batangas, Manila, Iloilo, Mindoro and other points. Watch-towers and belfries began to dot the coastlines of the Spanish-held territories to keep a round-a-clock watch for approaching Moro raiders, whose approach brought the terrible cry: Moros en la costa. Mothers frightened their children to sleep by the mere mention of the word Moro. The name became so dreaded that it evoked such offensive meaning as “pirate”, “traitor” or “heathen”. For a span of a decade during this period, now fewer than 50,000 captives were taken and many coastal towns were totally destroyed, their population greatly reduced.

Roughly the same degree of destruction against the Moros also took place from both the offensives and counter-offensives of the Spaniards. There were many tales of decimation of lives and property. Sometimes a whole Moro settlement would be depopulated.

On February 27, 1851, Spain launched a massive assault on Jolo, employing of a fleet of one corvette, one brigantine, three steamboats, two gunboats, nine transports, 21 barangays and other boats of different sizes. The attacking force was composed of 142 officers, 2,876 men and about a thousand native volunteers. On the defenders’ side were about 10,000 Moro warriors. As usual, Jolo was bombarded first and then the ground assault followed. In the ensuing fighting, the Spaniards reported 34 dead and the Moros 300. Jolo was razed to the ground. However, the Sulu sultan disputed this by saying that only 100 Moros died.

More than any factor, the introduction of the steamboat in the Spanish navy was the greatest plus factor that turned the tide against the Moros. The Moros caracoa, however swift, was no match to the Spanish steamship equipped with heavy artillery. Consequently, Spain was able to conduct bigger and more sustained operations against the Moros of Mindanao and Sulu. The period witnessed the defeat of the Moros in Basilan, Malabang and Jolo. One such reversal was scored in Balangingi, Basilan in 1845, against the Balangingi Samals, sometimes referred to by the Spaniards as the “fiercest pirates” of the Sulu seas. After a gallant but futile stand, the Balangingi Samals were routed after seventeen days of bloody combat, and the survivors, mostly women and children, were exiled to Luzon. Many of their descendants are still found in the town of Tomauini, Isabela, but what is only left to them is their ability to recite the Islamic formula of faith: “There is no God except Allah and Muhammad is the last Prophet of Allah.”

In the meantime, the Sulu and Maguindanao sultanates were besieged by dynastic dissensions. On 1862, after the death of Pulalun, the Sulu throne was a toss-up between Jamalul Alam, son of Pulalun and Datu Jamalul Kiram, a grandson of sultan Shakirullah. Spain, having knowledge of the split up, issued a certificate of recognition to Datu Jamalul Kiram. On 1884, a power struggle was apparent between Ali ud-Din and Amirul Kiram contesting to the throne. Spain favored Amirul Kiram but later on began making negotiation with Ali ud-Din.

In the Maguindanao sultanate, the dynastic quarrel was equally disastrous. About 1731, the reigning Sultan Bayan ul-Anwar was opposed by his younger brother, Jaafar Sadiq, who had earlier in 1710 fled to Tamontaka. Jaafar Sadiq had excellent relations with the Spaniards. He was credited with having allowed the Spaniards to build the first Catholic Church in Maguindanao which still stands today. The Sultan had a son, Malinug, who by all indications would succeed his father and therefore could frustrate the ambition of the uncle. A series of clashes ensued which culminated in the second week of March 1733, when Malinug with 700 warriors attacked his uncle’s capital at Tamontaka and slew him.

In a bid to break all forms of resistance and to settle once and for all the issue of sovereignty over the Moros, Spain launched on February 21, 1876 what became as the final Jolo campaign. Governor Gen. Jose Malcampo personally led the campaign involving 9,000 troops, ten steamboats, eleven gunboats and eleven transports. Public approval, especially on the religious enmity, was carefully sought to support the campaign. In the forefront of this campaign were the friars of the various denominations: Recollects, Jesuits, Dominicans and Augustinians. Together, they heralded: “The war in Jolo is now just a war, a holy war in the name of religion,” or “war and war without quarters or rest for the wicked sons of the Qur’an; war to the death with blood and fire.”

As in the past, the action was preceded by intense bombardment and followed by infantry assaults from all directions. One cotta after another fell in intense and bloody fighting and was put to the torch. In the face of these assaults, the Sultan, warriors and retainers retired to the interior – to fight another day.

The decline of the sultanate, its inability to provide centralized and effective defense of the state and religion, paved the way for the emergence of another form of resistance. The task became a matter of individual obligation. This practice was what hostile writers called the juramentado.

The term juramentado was derived from the Spanish verb juramentar, meaning “to swear an oath.” It was sarcastically used by the Spaniards and their hirelings to refer to anyone committing suicide or running amuck. Others presented the image of a rushing Moro warrior with shaven hair, fiery eyes and plucked eyebrows, brandishing kris or kampilan to attack infidels until he was slain.

Actually this greatly maligned juramentado was a person who had chosen to fight in the way of Allah in his individual capacity since, as stated above, the sultanate had ceased to put up an organized resistance against the Spaniards. He was what in the Moro viewpoint was called Sabilillah. The juramentado, after some initiation rituals and proper prayers and manifesting the resolve to die for the cause, acted out his part as a sacred duty and when he died in the course, of his attack, he became shahid or “martyr” with paradise as his ultimate reward. As with any real Muslim warrior, the juramentado loved martyrdom more than life.

The juramentado was the exact opposite of running amuck or committing suicide. The juramentado was a volunteer of conscience, with a strong will to fight – and to die – and was rightly guided by the Islamic requirements to strive in the way of Allah. It is a conscious undertaking and the one committing himself to the task had full certainty of the Almighty’s promise of eternal bliss in paradise. In suicide or in running amuck, one become senseless and falls into a trance or into the trap of Satan. It is an almost unconscious action resulting from hopelessness. If hostile writers likened the juramentado to the second category, then they not only committed a grave offense against him and Islam but also against the rules of good scholarship.

During the closing years of the Spanish regime, there were radical changes in the state of affairs of Mindanao and Sulu. In 1861, the Spaniards garrisoned Cotabato, which became the capital of Mindanao ten years after. In 1872, fire and earthquake hit Cotabato and they decided to return as capital Zamboanga. During this year, Sultan Muhammad Makakua was on the throne with the blessing of the Spanish crown but had lost much of his territory. In Sulu, although Jamalul Kiram II was ruling with previous powers intact, chiefs at second level were beginning to assert themselves in the affairs of the realm which hampers the decision making of the sultan.

The decline of the Maguindanao sultanate led to the rise of minor sultanates in Iranun areas and Pulangi. The Iranuns of Malabang, Balabagan and nearby areas now looked up to the Sultan of Ganassi in the Lanao region as their new master. In the Pulangi, many of these sub-sultanates pledged loyalty to the Sultan of Buayan, Sultan Marajanuddin, who was in turn succeeded in 1865 by his brother, Sultan Bayao of Kudarangan. In 1875, Datu Utto or Sultan Anwaruddin Utto, son of Sultan Marajanuddin, took over as Sultan of Buayan. Datu Utto was married to Rajah Putri, daughter of Sultan Qudaratullah Muhammad Jamalul Alam or simply Sultan Untong. Datu Utto also maneuvered to be declared jointly as Sultan of Maguindanao. Openly, he was supporting the bid of his brother-n-law, Datu Mamaku, brother of Rajah Putri, to become the new Sultan of Maguindanao. But the Spaniards opposed his inclination vehemently. They saw in Datu Utto the making of a “second Qudarat”. Datu Utto was able to unite the minor sultanates along the Pulangi, including those of Talayan, Buluan and Kabuntalan. Although he suffered many reversals from the hands of the Spaniards, he remained unconquered up to the coming of the Americans.

In 1888, Gov. Gen. Valeriano Weyler succeeded Gov. Gen. Emilio Terrero. Instead of pursuing the military campaign against Datu Utto, the new Governor trained his attention on the Iranuns and Maranaos. In January 1889, Spanish troops landed in Parang and Malabang. In April 1891, Spanish troops reoccupied Parang, Baras and Malabang and after fierce clashes especially in the latter, decided in August to resume the campaign against the Maranaos. Thrown into action in this two-prolonged attack were 1,242 officers and men. Fierce encounters followed, especially in the cotta commanded by Amai Pakpak. In September, the campaign was terminated without conquering the lake Moros.

In March 1894, even after Weyler had left for Manila, the Spaniards pursued the campaign without letup. Pantar, near Marahui, (Marawi), was occupied. The datus of Taraca, Ramain, Maciu and Rumayan threatened and consequently they cooperated in fortifying their positions around the Agus River. Ambushes of Spanish soldiers and native allies became frequent and, at one time, 65 Spanish soldiers were killed, including one captain. The Spaniards retaliated by killing 35 Maranaos, including five datus. On June 24, about 500 Maranaos attacked 200 Spaniards, losing 200 of their own men.

On March 10, 1895, this time under Gov. Gen. Ramon Blanco, the Spaniards decided to bring the war back to Marahui and again, they encountered the same Amai Pakpak. In one of the cottas, 175 Moros perished including Amai Pakpak, his son and 23 datus. The Spaniards lost eighteen soldiers, including two officers and the wounded reached 197 soldiers including 21 officers. In this bit of action, about 3,000 Spanish troops and native allies were involved.

In Sulu, Sultan Jamalul Kiram II tried to honor the peace agreement with the Spaniards. This contributed largely to the lack of widespread fighting in his realm, although he kept on procuring arms from Borneo. However, in 1895, the celebrated brothers, Datu Kalbi and Julkarnain, who figured prominently during the American regime, led about a thousand Moros in the attack of Jolo. After some bitter fighting, the attack was contained.

This was the state of affairs during the last years of the Spanish presence in Mindanao and Sulu. If Spain was unsuccessful in completely putting down the Moros, it was not the result of faulty planning or the lack of genuine interest. On the contrary, her entire firepower, resources and manpower were all utilized to subjugate Mindanao and Sulu – and the Moros were still on their feet, not on their knees. As a fitting tribute to their gallantry and determination to resist even against formidable odds, history has appropriately referred to the Moros as the “unconquered.”

Spain came to the Philippines not much for the cross. In most instances, as the facts of her actuations were gradually exposed, religion was merely used to justify what otherwise was a satanic lust for worldly gain and glory. If she had firmly planted the Cross in the Philippines, she was no less successful in sowing the seed of hatred and animosity between the Moros and the Indios. Even if the Christianized natives absorbed the greater part of the misfortune that befell the entire inhabitants of Luzon and Visayas, this was the consequence of collaboration, even if they did this against their wishes. The long list of Spanish invasions in Mindanao and Sulu showed the participants of thousands of these natives, and their racial brothers – the Moros – found it almost impossible to distinguish the proselytized subjects from the colonial masters. Both were one in creating havoc in Mindanao and Sulu.

The Bangsamoro Struggle for Liberation

There are two important vital issues that need be reconsidered before proceeding to the different articles that describe the Bangsamoro (moro nation) people south of Philippines: first, what led to the emergence of the Muslim Moros armed struggle; and second, why do the Muslim Moros continue their armed struggle. Hereunder are the different views that we attempt to portray regarding the issues on hand:

What led to the emergence of the Muslim Moro armed struggle?

The Muslim Moros resorted to armed struggle because of the long period of oppression, exploitation, neglect and discrimination they suffered with their incorporation into the Philippine polity and certain triggering incidents. This suggests that the struggle was not cause by the Muslim Moros but by the unbearable conditions they were in. It was not because of the casual factors of their personal chemistry, culture and social structure. Nor it was caused by some kind of an inherently flawed Moro personality, alleged Islamic culture of terrorism or a warrior religion. Either it was caused by ethnic rivalries among Moro elites, hunger for power or passionate desire to grab political power from older leaders.

What precipitated the struggle are the Muslim Moros’ sufferings and insecurities associated with their economic marginalization and destitution, political domination and incapacity, the inroads and constraints to their identity (which includes their faith, territory and culture), and the threats (consummated and potential) to their individual and collective physical existence or security. Other factors are their perception of the insincerity of the Philippine government towards them, which is objectively tenable, and their perception of a more gloomy future awaiting them. Even without provocation, the Muslim Moros struggle in the seventies was by then ripe for an armed revolution. Although during these times, the Muslim Moros were not prepared, they launched the biggest revolution in history.

Comparing the then situation with the current one, the same scenarios are unfolding in the eyes of the Muslim Moros south of Philippines: economic marginalization, rampant land grabbing, massacres and bombardments of Muslim communities, salvaging, warantless arrests, central government dictated corruption on Moro traditional politicians to further aggravate their destitution, etc…

Why do the Muslim Moro continue their armed struggle?

Generations and generations of the Muslim Moros will come, armed struggle will always be a continuing process for as long as the territorial homeland of the Bangsamoro people is not returned to them and total freedom and independence is finally achieved. The Philippine government can craft millions of strategies to dazzle the eyes of the Moro people: promises of position, wealth, power, etc. but it will never stop the heart and mind of the Muslim Moros from achieving their aspirations and dreams for freedom and independence. After all, it is what is best for all Muslims in this homeland south of Philippines, Insha Allah.

A. The Struggle against Foreign Invaders

Retrospect

The discovery of the islands of Philippines by Ferdinand Magellan was incidental. On September 20, 1519, by orders of King Charles I, Ferdinand Magellan shepherded an expedition of 250 men and five (5) galleons in search for the “spice islands” he believed was located in the Pacific Ocean near America. From San Lucar, Spain they cruised around Cape of Good Hope, south of Africa then journeyed west around South America through the Strait of Magellan (a passage bearing his name), they traveled relentlessly for four months with no land in sight.

On March 16, 1521, they spotted Samar Island which they called “Archipelago of St. Lazarus” and stopped by an islet, later on called Homonhon Island before they disembarked at the island of Limasawa, south of Leyte. The first Catholic mass was celebrated by Magellan in Limasawa on March 31, 1521 and since then the conquest and conversion to Christianity of the natives of the various islands began. Most of the natives, because of fear for their lives, agreed to be baptized into Christianity. However, the natives who resisted the baptism were beheaded or made slaves by the Spaniards. Magellan almost succeeded in converting all the natives to Christianity except the island of Mactan where Rajah Lapulapu ruled. Rajah Lapulapu refused to give up his island and compromise his freedom. Thus, started the first heavy gun battle between the forces of Magellan and Rajah Lapulapu. It was during this bloody engagement where Rajah Lapulapu killed Magellan with his own bare hands. This was the very first armed struggle of the Moro people against foreign invaders in defense of their homeland.

Charles I sent three more expeditions: 1525, 1526 and 1527, after the death of Magellan but it all ended in defeat that made him disheartened and bankrupt. On April 22, 1529, Charles I signed the “Treaty of Zaragosa” with Portugal which provides: “a demarcation line in the Pacific at 297.5 leagues east of the Moluccas be drawn rendering all lands west of line belongs to Portugal including Philippines and on the west line belongs to Spain.

But Charles I became so greedy that he made a last-ditch attempt to establish a foothold in the east. He maneuvered an expedition under the command of Ruy de Villalobos specifically ordering him to establish a permanent settlement in the “Islas del Poniente” or “Western Islands” now called Philippines. For one year, they sailed the ocean until they reached the island of Sarangani, south of Mindanao. Villalobos and four Augustinian priests who accompanied him in the voyage tried to land on the island but were met by the hostilities of the Moro people so they hurriedly left the island. On their voyage home, they passed the islands of Samar, Leyte one of the crew, Bernardo dela Torre, named these islands “Filipinas” in honor of Philip, then the Spanish crown prince which later on became “King Philip II”, who succeeded Charles I. In 1556, King Philip II made it an official policy to colonize Filipinas. The name was later applied to the entire archipelago and was anglicized by the Americans to its present form,” Philippines.”

On November 1564, the expedition headed by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi left Mexico with his chief adviser and navigator, Fray Andres de Urdaneta, a scholar priest and veteran of the former Loaysa Expedition, sailed east to Philippines on orders of King Philip II to make it a permanent colony of Spain. Urdaneta refuses at first because the “Treaty of Zaragoza” was till in force but Legazpi ignored his advice. On April 27, 1565, they landed Panay Island and from there grappled all the islands from various Moro chieftains. Afterwards, Legazpi sent Captain Martin De Goiti to Luzon to seize a fortified town named “Selurong” now called Manila.

The Colonialism

Colonialism contributed significantly to the emergence of the struggle. It set the stage or the historical foundation of the struggle. Spain’s efforts to subjugate the Moros not only crippled or depleted the then relatively stable material infrastructure of the Moro society but also sowed the seed of the still persistent Christian-Muslim antagonism through the enlistment of the services of the Christianized Filipinos (Indios) in its brutality campaigns against the Moros, and several efforts designed to condition the former to hate the latter. In addition, although Spain had failed to effectively conquer the Moros after more than three centuries, it had provided a crucial beachhead for the subsequent outside penetration into Moroland. Spain’s aggressive military campaigns drove the Moros from most of the coastal parts of mainland Mindanao and established some forts and mission stations that housed Spanish soldiers and priests and their Indio collaborators or workers. The sites of these forts and mission stations served as the nuclei of the Christian settlements that started to burgeon in Mindanao towards the end of the 19th century.

On the other hand, American colonialism was the most decisive in the 20th century incorporation of the Moros and Moroland into the Philippine state. It was a coup de grace to Moro freedom and independence. The American military campaigns that involved wholesale massacre of the resisting Moros efficaciously cleared Moroland for its subsequent penetration and exploitation by foreign (largely American) and Indio capitalists and big northern Filipinos who migrated there after the beginning of the 20th century.

American colonialism ushered in the systematic plunder of Moroland’s resources. The enforcement of several capitalistic land laws dispossessed the Moros of most their agricultural lands. Foreign plantations (largely American) were among the first principal beneficiaries of the opening of Mindanao and the enforcement of capitalist land laws. Aside from the vast lands made available to plantation owners (foreigners and Indios), the then abundant timber and mineral resources of Moroland were also opened for exploitation by the same enterprising capitalists. In these frenetic efforts to fully exploit the resources of Mindanao, Moros were completely excluded and their rights to such lands and other resources trampled upon.

A. Spanish Colonialism

1. Inherited Colonial Dilemma

The basic character of Spanish colonization had to be prescriptive to sustain the colonial theory that evangelization and hispanization was practically one and the same thing. In consequence, this view becomes more meaningful when we read it in the light of what the natives were made to understand what becoming a Spanish subject meant. As a principle, the natives were to perceive that in becoming Christians they were becoming Spaniards, and that upon ceasing to be Subanos, Manobos, Maguindanaos, Tausogs, Samals or Maranaos, they were at one and the same time acquiring the status of wards of the Catholic Church as well as vassals of Spanish Monarch.

Spanish colonialism thus presented a challenge to the Moros of the Mindanao and Sulu. As far as the Moros perceived the situation, Spanish policy aimed at the undoing of such an organism as Moroism constituted. To the extent that there was a common identity by which the Islamized Philippine ethnic groups were given official recognition as Moros, they were people outside the Spanish national integrity and colonial hegemony. In the end, as the Jesuit Superior Pio Pi concluded at the beginning of the present century, Moroism subsisted as an element, which insured “that race its cohesion and duration in the islands.”

There was a view long held by the Spanish missionaries and exemplified by Pio Pi that “Moroism constituted a nucleus of population, which is nationality or state within sovereignty, systematically and obstinately opposed to the ruler’s civilizing aims.” In the opinion of the missionaries, the proper understanding of what constitutes “Moroism” was essential in overcoming this obstacle to the “reduction” (i.e. conversion) and civilization of Mindanao and Sulu. On this subject Pio Pi declared in a memorandum to the Papal Delegate Msgr. Placidus Louis Chapelle in 1900:

“…It will be of great interest to the country, and something to which the Government ought to direct its political labors with decision, to proceed to the reduction of Moroism as it exists in the Philippines to a perfect assimilation with the remaining population under a common law, and this under the penalty of driving it out from the territory by means of war, unless, perhaps the Government should prefer to concentrate it in some specified spot (a particular island or group of islands, for example), where the Moros might live with more or less autonomy and protection or with total independence. Otherwise the Mohammedan-Malay race will be ever in the Philippines, not merely in Mindanao and Jolo, a powerful element of disturbance.”

Let us note that the Spaniards cast the Moros as the out-group. This fact marked their socio-political existence as a direct minority group enabling the Americans, who took over from the Spaniards, to localize the Moros into a separate unit from the rest of the inhabitants of the Philippines. We have no intention of inquiring into how much the memorandum of the Jesuit Superior had influenced American colonial strategy in dealing with “Moroism”; but it should be mentioned that Pio Pi’s ideas caught the attention of the Americans and articulated for them the Spaniard’s conditioned attitude towards the Moros. Some Americans regarded Fr. Pi’s remarks as “replete with sensible observations.”

When the Americans assumed sovereignty over the archipelago they were ill prepared to face the question of Moroism, as it had existed under their Spanish predecessors. The geographical concentration of the Moro elements and the antagonism between them and the new colonial power prompted the American to regard the Moros as substantially different from the Christian population. The ambiguous terms “Christian Filipinos” and “non-Christian tribes” soon acquired official stamp in the population census. This ambiguity, however, provided the rationale for Americans to establish a somewhat different government for the Moros in the early part of their colonial administration.

In the first two decades of this century, American officials and Filipino nationalists argued over whether or not the inhabitants of the Philippines constituted a homogenous people. The Americans believed not, and held that therefore the Philippines was not ready to be governed or granted political independence as a single entity. Indeed, to the very end of the American regime the Moro problem persisted as a political factor in the Philippine Independence Question. Critics of Philippine Independence contended that Christian Filipinos could not establish a government of their own because of the existence of the “wild tribes,” including the Moros, whom they have no right to govern or were incapable of governing. In short, a sense of nationhood had not developed. This absence of national identity prompted the Thompson Mission, which investigated conditions in the islands in 1926 to report to President Coolidge, that the Moro were “a unit against independence.”

The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth Government in 1935 rapidly institutionalized a government of and by Filipinos. But it did not completely alter the pre-nationalistic situation. Nor did political independence in 1946 prove to be an integrative event eliminating the so-called Moro problem. In the post-independence period the problem of administering the Moros assumed merely new forms and strands inherited from the colonial dilemma.

2. The Spanish Reduction Policy

Having shown that a Filipino national identity had not yet fully developed before the achievement of formal independence, we shall now return to our central theme of continuity with past policies. It is important to note that until 1578 there was no thought at high Spanish policy levels of a coordinated administration of Muslim affairs. Spanish colonial policy was no more than continuing the “just wars” against all Muslim peoples (Moros) and expanding Spanish territorial conquest. But in 1578 Governor Francisco de Sande outlined a more precise Spanish policy toward the Moros. In a Letter of Instruction to the Figueroa Expedition to Mindanao and Sulu, he proclaimed a policy designed (1) to reduce the overlord of Sulu and his subjects to vassals of the Spanish King; (2) to reduce the overlord of the Great River (Pulangi) of Mindanao and his subordinate to subjects of the King of Spain; (3) to exercise control over trade and commerce in the islands and exact tribute from the inhabitants; (4) to stop the annual Moro raids against the Visayan islands which were under Spanish dominion; and (5) to inform the Moro chiefs that Spain’s aim was their conversion and to order them to allow the Spaniards freely to preach Christianity among the natives and to prohibit any further admission of preachers of Islam to their domains.

This might be termed as the Spanish policy of reduction which was of historical significance for the development of subsequent colonial policy towards the Moros. It draws attention to the fact that the establishment of Spanish sovereignty in the Islands also involved the propagation of the Catholic religion. It is undeniable that the Spanish governance of the Philippines was organically intertwined with the position of the Catholic Church in the Spanish State, and missionaries were included in all Spanish expeditions dispatched to the Philippines. Moreover, as a matter of policy, missionaries usually accompanied military expeditions within the Philippines, whether to the northern end of the archipelago or to the southern islands.

Now the historical continuity in which we are interested is that quite consistently the Catholic religion came to the Muslim south as an integral part of military expeditions and of the colonial government. This participation of the Church in the Spanish penetration of the Muslim south was perfectly consistent with Catholic mission theory and was also a concomitant of the union of church and state in Catholic Spain. Despite occasional strains and stresses, Church and State in the Philippines were mutually supportive. Toward the end of the Spanish regime, Governor Valeriano Weyler admitted in a confidential memorial:

“Religion can and should be in Luzon and the Visayas a means of government which is to be taken advantage of, and which justifies the necessity of the religious orders.”

This applied with equal force in Mindanao and Sulu, since the political and religious environment created by the Spanish colonial administration manifested a uniform pattern. What is consistent about this pattern was the way in which missionary activity had been interlocked with governmental authority.

The whole system of Spanish colonial administration depended upon the religious orders that were in actuality the direct transmitters of government policies among the Filipino villagers. In an era when the colonizers were no more than a handful of Spanish civil officials and soldiers, the practicability of utilizing the clergy in administrative matters was understandable enough. It became an implied principle of Spanish administrative control over the colony. But it was often abused and triggered an anti-clerical movement in the closing years of Spanish rule.

The Moros, reacting against the imposition of a monolithic colonial administration, nurtured throughout a psychological attitude of associating colonial domination with missionary activities. Thus, if anything was imbedded in the mind of the Moros it was the fact that they became acquainted with Christianity through the methods of Spanish reduction and pacification campaigns. Spanish attempts at the colonial subjugation of the Moros resulted in a variety of responses, all of them based on a deeply unfavorable impression of the transmitters of Christianity. Moreover, the Moros made no distinction between the Spanish colonists and the hispanized natives who were in the colonial administrative and military service. For all that, the task of subjugating the Moros proved futile and not surprisingly. Moro cultural sub-national tendencies came to be centered on fear against alienation from Islam and not just on all forms of domination.

3. The Civilization Policy

We have seen thus far that the Spaniards used Christianity as a symbol of social cohesion and political allegiance with the colonial administration. We shall not take the time here to recount the Spanish missionary activities in Mindanao and Sulu; it properly belongs to the history of the Church. However, we should emphasize the tremendous influence, which the religious mission had on Spanish strategies in dealing with the Moro population. The coming of the Jesuits to Mindanao in the mid-nineteenth century was, for instance, a significant event in itself, and coincided with the period when the colonial government was implementing a specialized political organization of Mindanao and its adjacent islands.

Phelan in his Hispanization of the Philippines makes the point that in the second-half of the nineteenth century the Spanish government had begun to distinguish between the adoption of Catholicism and the acceptance of political control. The Spanish decision evolved from a complex of motives. It was only in 1860 that by royal order the politico-Military Government for Mindanao and its adjacent islands was organized, and its structure was to become the forerunner of the administrative organization of the region into territorial units and political subdivisions. By the same royal directive the Society of Jesus was assigned “to look after the spiritual wants of the Islands” and at the same time it was commissioned to “secure the conversion of the races which have not yet been subjected.” Spain’s determination to assert itself in the Mindanao-Sulu region was partly in response to the claims of other colonial powers, and it marked a new policy toward the Moros. Both Spanish administrative techniques and religious measures were aimed at an expansionist drive, which included the “emancipation” of other natives from Moro domination. Moreover, the Spaniards were convinced that the region must be opened to “civilization” and its natural resources exploited. A policy was implemented which looked to the systematic occupation of Mindanao by Christians from the North, and the development of the natural resources of the region. Spain aimed at accelerating the increase of “Christian souls” in the region and at assimilating the whole of Mindanao.

At first the “Moro Wars” rendered ineffectual the settlement and colonization of Mindanao. But in the second quarter of the 19th century, Spanish missionaries began successfully to utilize the colonization policy and brought large numbers of Christians from the overpopulated and poorer islands of the Visayas and Luzon to Mindanao. The first enclaves of Christian native colonists from Bohol and Siquijor were resettled at northern coastal points on Mindanao. The project was well advanced but far from complete by the end of the Spanish regime.

The Americans, possibly drawing ideas from the Spaniards or inspired by their own history of westward expansion, continued the colonization strategy to full advantage. In 1914, the first “agricultural colonies” were set up in Pikit, Cotabato, under the administration of Governor Frank Carpenter. The previous year, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2254 to provide the sum of P400, 000.00 for the establishment of such colonies as a means of affording “opportunities to colonists to become landed proprietors and to bring under cultivation wild public lands” as well as to “equalize the distribution of population.”

Government-sponsored organized land settlement, with very little concern for the Moros’ rights of prior possession or for their landholding concepts, thus became a pattern. Act 4197 of the Philippine Legislature, commonly known as the Quirino-Recto Colonization Act, followed the first law in the Commonwealth period and it soon became the organic charter of organized land settlement work. This was to be followed after World War II by the LASEDECO, NARRA and the EDCOR programs.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the increase in the Christian population in Mindanao and Sulu gave the Jesuit missions a new impetus for the “liberation” of the hill and pagan tribes from Moro domination. It was calculated that the tribal groups more “docile” and susceptible to Christian conversion. Fr. Pablo Pastellas, S.J. arrived in Mindanao in 1876, and began the work of organizing the highland tribes into townships (pueblos), enlisting the cooperation of their chieftains. In some instances, the pueblo scheme enabled the missionaries to separate the Moros from the pagan groups.

The strategy of gathering scattered people together into pueblos was also designed for application to pacified and submissive Moro elements. The modus operandi called for a census of the Moros so as to determine who were subject to taxes and personal cedula, successful collection of which was an indication of Moro recognition of Spanish sovereignty. The execution of the plan was to proceed after placing the Moros under their own chosen governadorcillo (petty governors). According to Pastellas, afterwards:

“…gently and by means of their own justices, will follow the grouping of their settlements, district pueblos being raised among them, the obligation being place upon themselves of planning the streets and squares, with their corresponding public buildings, tribunal, schools, convent, and a small church. In this manner, a new form of government and of justice, our legislation and codes would continue to be observed, and moral culture are formented and established, and impulse given to the advancement of agriculture, industry, commerce, primary instruction, and solid maxims of the gospel.”

This is an early statement of the concept of assimilation of the Moros into the body politic, under a structure and law common to the mainstream of Spain’s Philippine colony. In bringing this about, it was the idea that through the habit of obedience to law “learned from a peaceful Christian education which it was the missionary’s task to provide,” it would be easy to transform the lives and change the customs of the Moros.

Of special interest is the fact that Catholic missionaries were encouraged to revise their conventional techniques of conversion and of socio-economic penetration without hinting at Christianization. Once this was attained, it was hoped that there might be planted among their pueblos a system of leadership similar to that in other parts of the archipelago. This point needs emphasis, for the fact is the role of the traditional and religious leadership in Moro society has provided considerable continuity between the different periods of Moro history.

The Spaniards long recognized that the success of their colonial objectives as applied to the Moros required the alienation of the Moro peasantry from their traditional and religious leaders. The inability of the Spanish missionaries to infiltrate the Muslim power structure led them to identify the panditas and datus as the real obstacles to Christian reduction and Spanish civilization, precisely because they were the real guardians of tradition and repositories of traditional authority. The key ideas were suggested as early as 1885 by F. Quirico More, S.J. who recommended to his Jesuit Superior that Spanish control of the Moros required at least the following:

1. Eliminate the offices of dato and pandita, implanting in their stead in the Moro villages the legislation in force in the Christian villages by naming municipalities with which the government will deal directly.

2. The exclusion from holding offices of those who have been datos or panditas, and their children.

3. Absolute prohibition to the datos to continue collection of tribute from their own people and the heathens of other races.

The hostile disposition of the Moro aristocracy toward Spanish “civilizing aims” moved the missionaries to attempt to undermine the traditional authority. Their effort was a concommitment of the type of colonial rule favored by the Spaniards – that is, direct rule.

4. The Direct Rule System

Unlike the British system of indirect rule (applied in Malaya) which kept traditional authorities in their positions of influence, the Spanish colonial system of direct rule required the elimination of native socio-political structures and the traditional power elites functioning in their customary roles. The rationale of this policy was the system of direct rule hastened the implantation of Christian or Western principles and institutions. In short the system of direct rule served the Spanish objective more effectively.

With the advent of the American colonial adventure in the Philippines this policy was reversed initially with respect to the Moros. American pluralistic background at first impelled the United States to draw from her Federal American Indian policies in dealing with Moro affairs. Features of American Indian Policy were applied in the Philippines by President McKinley in his instructions to the First Philippine Commission in 1900:

“… in dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by the Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by a civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform.”

The American version of “indirect rule” seemed to recognized ethnicity as a valid basis for an administrative unit. Early American policy, negotiated through a “treaty,” enhanced the position of the ruling datus as in the case of Bates Treaty of 1899. Between the abrogation of the Bates Treaty, in 1905, and the passage of the Jones Law in 1916, the American authorities concerned themselves with establishing an administrative system for Mindanao and Sulu. The system they devised seemed torn between a policy of indirect and a policy of direct rule. In 1903 the Moro Province was created; it gave an important administrative role to “tribal wards” and permitted traditional authorities to carry out certain administrative tasks under government supervision. Moreover, the structure of the Moro Province with its own Governor and Legislative Council provided for a time (until it was abolished in 1913) a considerable de facto autonomy for Mindanao and Sulu.

In an essay on the history and solution of the problems of the government on the Moros of the Philippines, Najeeb Saleeby declared:

“By the Moro problem is meant that method or form of administration by which the Moros and other non-Christian who are living among them, can be governed to their best interest and welfare in the most peaceful way possible, and can at the same time be provided with appropriate measures for their gradual advancement in culture and civilization, so that in the course of a reasonable time they can be admitted into the general government of the Philippine Islands as qualified members of a republican organization.”

Echoing President McKinley’s statement of American Mandate in the Philippines that the United States came not to exploit but “to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government,” Saleeby considered the government of Moro land a sacred trust. He insisted that the principle of “the Philippines for the Filipinos” was meant to apply to Mindanao and Sulu in the same sense in which it was applied to the Visayas and Luzon. Underscoring the value of a policy of indirect rule in Moro affairs, Dr. Saleeby concluded that “Well organized datuships properly provided with Moro courts and datuship councils mark the main basic structure on which rests the whole solution of the Moro problem.” He added that “a Moro community thus organized can be admitted into the general family of civilized Filipino tribes and may in a short time occupy a fairly respectable position in the fellowship of nations.”

But Saleeby’s advocacy of indirect rule for the Moros was not heeded as the central administration in Manila geared all its efforts in preparation for national self-government. In 1914 the Philippine Commission replaced the Moro Province with the Department of Mindanao and Sulu and it became conscious policy to weld the culturally diverse elements of the population into a Filipino nation. This objective can be perceived in the following sentences from the act creating the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.

Whereas it is the desire of the people of the Islands to promote the most rapid moral, material, social, and political development of the inhabitants of said department in order to accomplish their complete unification with the inhabitants of other provinces of the Archipelago; and

Whereas for the accomplishment of this purpose the extension thereto of the general laws of this country and of the forms and procedures of government followed in other provinces, under certain limitations in harmony with the special conditions now prevailing in said department, is among other measures advisable and necessary, but always with the understanding that such limitations are temporary and that it is the firm and decided purpose of the Philippine Commission to abolish such limitations together with the departmental government as soon as the several districts of said region shall have been converted into regularly organized provinces;

In effect this constituted a structural approach to the Mindanao and Sulu situation. There has been no set of ideas more influential in providing the direction of policies and objectives in the government of Moro affairs than the above sentences from the preamble to the Department of Mindanao and Sulu Act. For instance, the Commission on National Integration (established in 1957) was profoundly indebted to the thinking which had been behind the Department of Mindanao and Sulu in 1914. The CNI assumed the identical objective “to effectuate in a more rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the national cultural minorities” and also “to render real, complete and permanent the integration of all said national minorities into the body politic.”

5. The Wardship Policy of the United States

 

There was another feature of American government of the Moros which is often overlooked: the ward ship policy. The marked difference in culture and civilization of the Moros and the Christianized Filipinos made it difficult to govern them alike in the beginning. Two forms of government thus developed along parallel lines, one for the Moros and the other for the Christianized Filipinos, although it was expected that the structure employed in Moro land would eventually evolve into the structures common to the rest of the Philippines.

The phrase “wards of the government” was first used by Chief Justice Marshall in the Supreme Court of the United States when describing the Federal-Indian relationship as analogous to that between a guardian and his ward. As the legal status of the Moros was tied up conceptually with the American policy of federal responsibility for the welfare of the American Indians tribes, the Moro elements were thought as being in a position analogous to the Indians. This had the effect of making inhabitants subject to certain legal constraints. We should note that it was the various Moro ethnic groups, officially labeled “non-Christian tribes,” and not the individual Maguindanaon, Maranao of Tausug which were contemplated under “wardship.”

Evidently, wardship applied not to individual persons as the government did not mean to assume responsibility over Moro individual activities. But it was felt necessary to exercise trusteeship over the territorial possessions of Moro groups. This distinction becomes significant when we consider that in the conduct of Moro affairs the United States acknowledged the possessor rights of the “tribes” of the geographic areas which they occupied, but it regulated eventually “the right of alienation” by requiring government approval. The differential legal status of the Moros was thus symptomatic of their segregation in keeping with the extent to which they were culturally different from the Christianized elements.

One result of this situation was that “wardship” made a contribution to the growth of Moro cultural sub-nationalism. Indeed, the idea was seriously proposed by some Americans and Moros that the grant of political independence to Filipinos should not include Moros. This notion culminated in the proposal under the Bacon Bill of 1924 which sought to remove Mindanao and Sulu – homeland of the Moros – from the Philippine national government. It would seem however that this proposal was tied to the projected development of rubber and other resources in Mindanao and Sulu. There was a brief period from 1920 to 1928 when foreign economic interests supported Moro apprehensions about Christian Filipino rule as a rationale for the retention of American jurisdiction over Mindanao and Sulu.

The Japanese seemed to have developed commercial interests in the southern Philippines even prior to the Second World War. During the Commonwealth era there was a continuous influx of Japanese settlers in Davao. Soon after the Japanese occupation began, the Imperial Research Commission considered a plan to divide the Philippines by severing Mindanao and Sulu from it. But at the January 6, 1943 session of the Commission, Murata Shozo, the chairman, registered a remarkable objection:

 

 

“I know there is a plan to detach Mindanao from the Philippines and develop it into a base for southward expansion. The navy is interested in some such plan. General Tojo has no such plan. It is indeed preposterous for us to declare we are in favor of granting independence to the Philippines, on the one hand, and then to detach Mindanao from them and hold it as a Japanese territory. I am opposed to such a plan…”

 

Mindanao has remained a tempting lure to foreign nations and it can still be said that – as historian J.R. Hayden once remarked – “Mindanao is either a treasure-house of national wealth or an island of national peril for the future Philippine Republic.”

B. American Colonialism

At the turn of this century, the United States joined the European powers in the colonial ventures overseas. Behind the American expansionist designs in the Pacific Islands and the Philippines was an outgrowth of the competition for empire traced to the events of the 1890’s. Under these circumstances, the possession of the Philippine Islands as a U.S. tropical colony brought the Moros in contact with the Americans. But the ironic twist in that encounter has been that the repeated clashes between the American troops in Mindanao and the Moros gave publicity to the Moros as the “problem.”

1. Two Faces of American Presence

The Spanish government in the Philippines created complex dilemma for the Moros which was defined by the religious and politico-military conduct of affairs that the Americans inherited from Spain. The Moros absorbed that “problem image” but the Americans institutionalized that state of affairs in the reality of the “Moro problem”. That image might best be qualified by two corresponding faces of American presence in Mindanao and Sulu. Interestingly, the idea that Mindanao as “the land of promise” derived from the American myth of the frontier as the promised land. What a promising land Mindanao must have appeared to the colonists who were taken by the alluring slogan: “Young Man, Go South!”

From one angle this conjures up the parallel of “the winning of the West” that lured American pioneers to seek adventure with the promises of abundance. Thus, early in his term the first governor of the Moro province, Gen. Leonard Wood, noted that what was needed in Mindanao was “an influx of such people as built up the West.” Likewise, the District Governor of Cotabato, boasting about the great possibility of the valley, declared in 1907 that “all we need now is a few bustling Americans to go there to make it the most productive region in this archipelago.”

In another spectrum, Mindanao as a frontier resembled the Wild, Wild West – a land of violence and lawlessness. Actually, one of the dangers in the Philippine Independence Question convincing even pro-independence American leaders like William Jennings Bryan was “the reputed menace of the war-like Moro to his more peaceful northern brother.” This appealed also as a convincing argument against independence, when played up in the press. In fact, complained one Filipino journalist: “certain American correspondents in Manila made names for themselves in the United States and gained notoriety in the Philippines by yellowing, inflating insignificant troubles or disorders in Mindanao and “shooting” them to the Metropolis as horrible carnages, notoriety debaucheries and appalling massacres.”

2. Evolution of Administration of Moro Affairs

The march of events from 1898 to 1916 may be seen as the evolution of American administration of Moro affairs. As we view the relations between the Americans and the Maguindanao Muslims along the Moro Gulf to the Cotabato Valley we need to recognize one point. And that is, the official pattern of relationship which results from the American presence in Mindanao was variegated as the local conditions prevailing in each region. The American military strategy itself sharply differentiated the pattern of relations as follows:

“First, operations under the Bates’ Treaty in the Jolo archipelago; second, operations on the north coast of Mindanao against hostile insurgents; third, operations on the south and east of Mindanao to reestablish good order and government, to regulate the intercourse between Filipinos and Moros, and to secure and maintain the confidence of the alien races inhabiting this section.”

The first American to set foot on Cotabato attempted to achieve the third strategy without much resistance. The initial efforts of winning over the confidence of the Chinese population complemented the regulation of intercourse between the Moros and the Christian elements in Cotabato. As the “Petition to the Provost-Marshal-General in the Philippine Islands” indicates, American contact with the Chinese element in Cotabato was made as early as May 28, 1899, or at least attempt was made to verify the state of affairs. In January, that year, the Spanish Government in the district had evacuated to Zamboanga. The petition described the condition:

“To the end that the moral and material order of this community might be preserved, there was organized a body of volunteer soldiers, under the command of a single officer, who, under the orders of the former chief dato, has rendered valuable services, to the great satisfaction of the community, which efforts are supported by the Chinese commercial interests in the subject by reason of their having established here their industries and commerce, owning property, etc., which represents a very large sum of money, and especially as they have in the district their families.”

Clearly, the Capitan de Chinos through tact and competence tried to invite the American troops. It was to their business interest that the Chinese acknowledged as well the protection they received from Datu Piang who was a half-bred Chinese.

On February 1, 1900, the first visit was made to Datu Piang at his settlement, in Dulawan, by the American commanding officer and his men on the US gunboat Panay. Datu Piang peacefully and easily made friends with the American authorities. Thus, the Philippine Commission sent to investigate conditions succeeded in bringing about an orderly transition of control. As Daniel Williams noted in his diary of April 1, 1901, the Commission was greeted “by as heterogeneous a crowd as imagination can conceived.” Advised of the coming of the Commission the upriver Moro datus and their following came to Cotabato. It having been the initial American policy for military authorities to occupy merely “the role of counselors and arbitrators in Moro Affairs,” no efforts were made to establish local government.

The American authorities instituted between 1898 and 1903 a government by military districts. It became the principal business of the commanding officers to hear and decide complaints. As this procedure became cumbersome, it was decided on December 7, 1901, to organize a board of arbitration chosen by the Moros themselves to hear all such complaints of a purely civil nature. The policy of going among the people and allowing officers to go among them alone and unarmed became a feature of buying goodwill. The result had been satisfactory in Cotabato and the response can be gleaned from this account:

“For the first three years or so the army got along very well with the Moros of the Rio Grande. From Cotabato and outposts at old Spanish forts and block-houses, exploring parties traveled up and down the river, stopped at villages on the riverbank, and made friends with Moros of high and low degree.”

Under the military administration, as the army was charged with maintaining communication lines, telegraph was extended from Cotabato to Davao during the same period. It was later connected to Tamontaka by telephone, and then followed by Taviran, Kudarangan and Reina Regente. Significantly, during a hearing before the US Senate Committee on Philippine Problems on April 10, 1902, recommendation was made “for the extension of a road around the Lake Lanao to and across the divide to Parang which would be the base ultimately and commercial port for all southern Mindanao, the road to be extended to Cotabato.” But it was not until 1937 that the main outline of the Mindanao highway was completed. From Cagayan a first class road connected Dansalan (Marawi) to Iligan; from Dansalan, a second road connected Cotabato via Malabang and Parang; from Cotabato, the road continued through the valley, across the Davao mountains to the Gulf. By 1938, there were in Mindanao and Sulu 1,092.9 kilometers of first class road, 1,115.1 kilometers of second class road, and 581.3 kilometers of third class road or a total of 2,789.3 kilometers of roads.

3. Government of the Moro Province

This brings us to the period from 1903 to 1919. Reviewing the historic sweep of changes in American Moro policy gives perspectives on the government dilemma of today. A summary of past methods bears repeating here in part: The Americans looked at Moro Affairs as a form of administrative concern to admit the Moros as qualified members of a republican national organization. The Commonwealth faced it as problem of national identity, and placed the administration of Moro Affairs under the Department of Interior with a Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu. The decision to abolish the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes that had supervision over the special provinces was contained in the message of President Quezon to the First National Assembly on July 16, 1936, for reasons of fostering the social and economic development of the regions under that bureau. The Bureau was replaced by the Commission on Mindanao and Sulu.

As we gather from various reports and studies on the government of the Moro province, it remains debatable whether its abolition in 1913 in favor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu (1914-1919) was a step backward or forward in Filipino self-government as it related to Moro affairs. At least, even as early as 1905, a Philippine Commission report perceived the complex problem as follows:

“It was recognized that any effort in the direction of establishing government among the Moros must in the nature of things be tentative and experimental, and that in all probability it would be necessary subsequently to modify any government established. It was not deemed wise or just, except to the extent absolute necessary, to impose upon them the system of laws and of administration of justice which was well adapted to the Christian Filipinos, but which must prove burdensome and odious to them.”

The Moro Act of 1903 (Act No. 787), therefore, instituted a government with a governor, a legislative council given broad autonomous powers, and created certain necessary executive offices. Likewise created was a constabulary force to be composed of Moros commanded by white officers, under the direction of an assistant chief of constabulary. Provision was also made for the establishment of a public school system. In addition, the Legislative Council of the Moro Province was specifically enjoined by the Philippine Commission “to enact a law which shall collect and codify the customary laws of the Moros.”

Despite the special problems that Muslim Mindanao presented, Peter Gowing, an American scholar of Moro affairs, sees the shaping of American Moro policy as an extension of the policy formulated for the Christian population. Along with this common purpose, the Americans recognized as well Mindanao’s economic potentials. As Theodore Friend has shown, the historical discussion of the Philippine Independence acts was centered “obsessively on American economic interests.” In the process, according to Ralph Thomas, the development of Mindanao had been delayed by “Christian fears that substantial American investment might contribute to the alienation of those southern areas from the rest of the Philippines.” And nowhere has the brutalizing effects of colonial policy manifested Christian colonization than in Cotabato even as the Americans charted the political future of Mindanao.

4. Early American Economic Policy for Mindanao

a) Moro Trade

Over the centuries the Moros were masters of their own maritime trade. Noticeable decline in commerce for the Maguindanao traders began to affect Cotabato’s economy towards the second part of the nineteenth century. In 1845 Sultan “Untong” Qudratullah entered into a treaty with the Spaniards allowing a trading house at Cotabato to arrest the declining volume of business in the region. The American entry entailed a new commercial policy for Mindanao. In 1901, the Philippine Commission was informed that rice, coffee, gutta-percha (rubber), almaciga and bees-wax were the major exports of Cotabato sent by the Chinese to Singapore. The volume that could be gathered was 500 to 600 piculs every two months with an aggregate of about $150,000 (Mexican dollars). The Moro traders of the Pulangi dealt in gutta-percha because they controlled the lands in which these trees grew. The Chinese were the ones who held the bulk of the trade because they maintained friendly relations with the Moros. An interview with Alejandro Doroteo, a Filipino Christian resident of Cotabato, impressed the Philippine Commission in 1901 that the Filipinos kept little shops in the town.

The annual Report for 1906 of the Moro province reflected that the commerce of the Cotabato district was still largely in the hands of the Chinese. The value of exports from the port of Cotabato amounted to $83,600.00 for the past year. This accounted for the value of exports from the ports of Cotabato alone and did not include those from other parts of the districts as from Tamontaka via the south branch of the Rio Grande to other districts. At the close of 1906, the Government considered the establishment of a commercial boat on the Cotabato River, which was flat-bottom, stern-wheel affair drawing eighteen inches to two feet. Coastwise shipping seemed to have expanded by 1919 providing sufficient tonnage for the waters of Mindanao and Sulu.

Comparison of economic statistics under the Moro Province and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu represent a steady increase in the volume of exports. By 1911, Cotabato exports valued at P138, 892.13 leaped to P391, 135.78 in 1913, the year ending the term of the Moro Province. Department figures indicate that in the Province of Cotabato exports jumped from P448, 800.39 to P760, 426.42, owing to the expanded production of both food crops and cash crops.

The intention to protect Moro and other native inhabitants from unscrupulous businessmen was accented by the setting up of “industrial trading stations” in 1910 which had replaced the Moro exchanges. The Legislative Council also passed in 1913 an “Itinerant Traders Law” to protect the non-Christians from unscrupulous traders. The law obliged traders to secure license at the district governor level, thus relieving a problem which had become particularly serious in the Cotabato and Davao district. By an act regulating the trading system in the Department of Mindanao and Sulu passed in 1916 by the Philippine Commission, the Insular Government extended new “trading systems” to the regions lacking trade facilities.

b) Land Tenure System

American land policy as effected in the Cotabato district began to take shape between 1905 and 1913. As illustrated by General Wood’s recommendation at the end of his term to which his successor General Tasker Bliss agreed, in the Moro Province-

“Land should neither be homestead, leased, nor sold to individuals or corporation in those districts occupied by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, except on a certificate by the district governor that the land is actually unoccupied, or that being occupied, a satisfactory arrangement has been entered into between the native occupant and the would-be settler, purchaser, or lessee. A simple arrangement of this description will prevent the crowding out of natives and will do much, to give them a feeling of security, thereby tending to establish friendly relations with their white neighbors. Above all, it will help them to hold on to their present holdings to the extent authorized by the land law until they can be regularly surveyed”

In a certain way the Wood and Pershing administrations resembled each other in their approach to the land problems. In General John Pershing’s report for 1913, what General Wood anticipated is mentioned again:

“The effect to fix Moros upon their land is a very important step forward their civilization and should continue until the head of every Moro family becomes settled down on land that will pass from father to son in perpetuity. When this is accomplished, there will be reasons to hope that the common individual Moro may eventually achieve industrial emancipation.”

Beginning in 1905 the Philippine Commission, by resolution, extended the application of The Land Act or portions thereof, as recommended by the Legislative Council of the Moro Province. The Act was effected in its entirety throughout Zamboanga, parts of Davao, the Lanao district, excluding that portion of the basin of the Lake. The provision relating to leases of the public domain was applied to the entire district of Cotabato, with the exception of the island on which the town of Cotabato, is situated, the island of Tamontaka, and certain immediate areas about the forts of Reina Regente and Pikit, and in the island of Tawi-Tawi in the district of Sulu. The part of the Act relating to homesteads on the public domain was made applicable to the portions excepted in the districts of Cotabato and Davao, and the immediate vicinities of the town of Jolo and of Siasi, in the district of Sulu.

If it was not complete physical isolation, transportation costs did much to handicap the surveys of land for registration under the Moro Province. In Cotabato, the district governor distributed a few hundred blank forms, but white businessmen had challenged Maguindanao claims over the valley before many could register their lands. The Maguindanao farmers and other native inhabitants generally did not care much about the surveys for two reasons. First, because perhaps the Moros refused to come completely under the influence of the government, or on account of conflicting attitudes on the nature of the land system. The Moros adhered to the pusaka (ancestral) land tenure. Second, it seems instructive to keep in mind that the settlement of the Moros in severality was the ultimate aim but it was another question whether they were prepared for such a change in their condition of communal ownership.

And yet, General Pershing had perceived by 1910 some changes. As he explained it, “in the District of Cotabato conditions are entirely peaceful, as they have generally since American occupation, with the exception of the time (of) Datu Ali.” In the main, he added, the Moros of this district “are less inclined to be nomadic than those of other localities,” and that he believed that the time had come “when they may be included to settle down permanently and occupy land in severality.” In retrospect, the town sites survey of Dulawan, Dansalan, Parang-Parang and Cotabato were competed in 1908. By 1911 soil tests had been competed also which showed that the Cotabato Valley was well suited for hemp, rubber, coconut, sugar cane, rice, corn and sweet potatoes in that order; Pikit and its environs were found to be favorable for the growth of rubber trees. It was apparent, however, that American concern for individualizing land ownership did not catch on with the average Moro minds. As of 1913, or seven years after the extension of the provisions of the Land Act to the Moro Province, only the land of about 1,000 Moros was surveyed in the Cotabato District.

Owing in fact to the length of time before lands could be accurately surveyed for registration the Moros defaulted in settling claims upon definite parcels of agricultural farms. Thus, when the American began a cadastral survey and introduced procedures for registering claims, the Maguindanaons lagged far behind in taking up disposable and alienable lands. This opened the avenues for speculations and land grabbing. The survey party, instead of making definite arrangements for the non-Christian natives to protect their rights, merely gave these people verbal assurance that their rights would be protected. So that, according to Karl Pelzer, land grabbers exploited the fact that “the bureau of lands based priority of claim upon priority of filing instead of priority occupancy.”

c) Moro Dependency Economy

In the development of agriculture in Cotabato the concern for land registration was a factor, but it was also tied to the problem of people. As in the pre-American period, the hold of the datus on the masses of the Maguindanao people was a function of the dependency economy. The situation was put forward in the historical context of the anti-slavery question. The economics of “slavery” among Maguindanao datus traced its root to the mangiaio (raid) system during the Spanish period. As an “industry” slave-raid was the productive activity itself.

But the slave traffic had changed by the time the Americans intervened in Mindanao for it had become economically unsound. A shift in manpower needs may have been the cause for the new profitability of slave-holding. Describing the process, Maj. Lea Febiger, who was the commanding officer of the Cotabato district in 1902, had this to say:

“The subject of slavery among the Moros is a difficult one to discuss, as the word does not define the condition that exists, and when it approaches slavery as understood by us (Americans) it has so many and indefinite side issues and ramifications that a white man can not grasp it. The so-called slaves, taken as a whole, are more like peons of the soil, vassals or serfs of feudal times. There is hardly a single follower of any dato that is not in his debt for money, supplies, or material advanced, and his vassalage is due to such debt.”

In more accurate terms the relationship was one of debt-bondsman.

At the start of the American period, the Philippine Commission found that about one-eight of the Moro population were debt-bondsmen. The Moros were estimated to number about 300,000 at the turn of the century but a 1903 census placed them at 250,000. In an interview, Datu Piang informed the Americans that in Cotabato not more than a quarter of the Maguindanao inhabitants were “slaves.” They were of two categories: (a) those that were purchase from other slaveholders and (b) those who sold themselves for debt. Most of the slaves were held for $40 to $50 (Mexican dollars) for which they did all kinds of work in the field and in the house. Presumably an economically viable system was beginning to develop when the Legislative Council enacted on September 24, 1903 the anti-slavery act (Act No. 8).

The difficulty in the way of the strategy that, hopefully, the abolition of slavery would lead to independent farming was that the Moro peasants had been cut off from access to direct credits which the dependency economy had been able to provide through the datu system. As it was, the Americans tried to impart individual industry and private acquisitiveness among the Moros in anticipation of getting them acquainted with the western economy. As titled properties, it was rationalized; land would turn into saleable and disposable commodity by individuals. The ironic twist was that the Moro farmer continued to occupy their traditional landholding through the datus; for, the novel element of banking system (as a capital source) was not introduced in the area until 1919. Where some favored the individual patents as opposed to communal ownership they proceeded to part with their lands or ended up mortgaging them rather than farm the area themselves.

Ill-prepared to participate in the new economic order, with its differing values and standards, the Moro sense of communal enterprise was blighted. As Datu Piang afterwards reflected:

“From a situation simple, clear, understandable to us, set up by the first government, when all was moving towards order, contentment and happiness we were plunged into one of confusion, which began in disorder, and for thirteen years turmoil, chaos, tyranny has marked its every step.”

By 1916 it was obvious that the change in the parameters of government control over Moro affairs was becoming complicated for the Muslims as it was not matched by political tutelage. But more comprehensible was the Christian Filipino policy of colonizing Mindanao as this has operated on the Moro land tenure system. Thus, Datu Piang complained:

“…The Moro has witnessed many of the choice parts of his country parceled out to (Christian) Filipinos.

He has seen the shrines once his ancestors gathered in solemn worship now converted into pig-wallows or drinking shops – two abominations to the Moslem.

He has been pushed from his better villages and towns and these sites given over largely to (Christian) Filipinos.”

American responsibility for bridging the transition had called for certain ward ship protectionism. For instance, in1913 the Legislative council passed Act No. 304 to prevent the Moros from unwisely disposing their land or other valuable holding “without the direct, written approval of the district governor.” This cumbersome but necessary extension of government assistance in conveyances or transactions found its way eventually into Chapter II of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu.

Soon demographic considerations tinged the problem before the Moros could be firmly settled and acquainted with the capitalist economy. For example, drought in 1913 caused serious decrease in rice supply in other parts of the Philippines so that it was decided to bring homesteaders from the overpopulated parts of the country to Cotabato. Pursuant to 2254 Christian Filipinos were settled in the upper part of Cotabato. Five agricultural colonies were initially set up in Cotabato Colony No. 1 at Pikit; Colony No. 2 at Silik; Colony No. 3 at Paido-Pulangi; Colony No. 5 at Pagalungan; Colony No. 7 at Talitay; and in 1919, Colony No. 9 at Glan was established.

Between 1913 and 1930 there were a total of 4,194 families of colonists and home seekers or 19,441 immigrants. From 19

Inside Bangsamoro

Muslim society had already attained a fairly high level of social organization and material prosperity even before the existence of the Filipino nation. It already possessed human and material resources and built-in cultural defenses against any foreign intrusion. Before the coming of the Spaniards, Mindanao and Sulu was an active participant in an international trading system. It was the epicenter of two trade routes: one was towards Java and the Moluccas; the other was towards China via Manila, with the Muslims fort in Mindoro in Luzon guaranteeing Muslim monopoly in domestic distribution.

Jolo (the present capital of Sulu Province), before the arrival of Spaniards, was already serving as one of the international trading ports in the Malayan world, frequented by Arab, Chinese and other Asian traders. Moro trade then extended from china to Japan, at one extreme, to Malacca, Sumatra and Java at the other. Before Metro Manila became the business district center, it was first Jolo who was playing the center of economic trading system for Manila and Cebu and was the richest and foremost settlement in the Philippine islands.

Other countries already recognized the Moro’s society sovereignty and independence: Spain, France, Netherlands, Britain and United States of America, long before the name Philippines ever existed, as evidenced by the different treaty relations signed by and between the Maguindanao and Sulu Sultanates and these countries.

Therefore, historically, the Bangsamoro people were free and independent and Mindanao and Sulu is their homeland.

A. People, Territory and Juridical Entity

Imaginative writers have given varied descriptions and labels to the Bangsamoro people and their homeland. Not a few have described them as “princess in pearls and warriors in silk, parading to the rhythm of the agong and kulintang,” or “seafarers with the sail of their vinta outriggers slashing multi-colored triangles from the horizon.”

As may be expected, others are rather unkind and unpleasant in describing the social manner of the Bangsamoro tribes. But whatever wrong connotations some writers may describe of the Bangsamoro people, honed by their historical and cultural experiences, they are much fortunate to be heirs of a distinct social and moral values which characterized them as a nation, proud of its own heritage and followers of the true religion, Islam.

Originally, the term “Moro” was used by colonialists meant to perpetuate an image of the Muslim people of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan as “savage and treacherous”, a word derived from the “Moors” of late Mauritania and later applied on the Berbers of North Africa who came and conquered Spain. In a larger context, the name is not confined to a group of people, or a nationality, but applied rather to a religious affiliation, transcending the barriers of geography, race and time. A simple daring and tenacious defense of their homeland and faith, the Spaniards brand the Moros as “savage and treacherous” and all monickers they can think of in order to justify their invasion of the homeland.

To cleanse the bad connotation attached to the Moros, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) propagated a more correct view that the tenacity with which they conducted their war of resistance against foreign invaders was a classic exercise of “heroism”. Hence, the MNLF adopted “Bangsa (nation) Moro” as a national identity and implants it in the consciousness of the masses.

Today, it is rooted in the heart of every man and woman and the defense of its integrity has become a national duty.

1. Origins of the Moro Identity

The three and one-third centuries that covered the Spanish colonization of the Philippines were years of struggle between Islam and Christianity for the allegiance of the native inhabitants of the archipelago, particularly Mindanao and Sulu. This struggle was the continuation of the reconquista, which had begun in the Iberian Peninsula, and the northern coast of the African continent. This age-long struggle has come full circle in Muslim-Christian dialogues both in Spain and Tunisia. About the same time that Islam was consolidating its new foothold in the southern islands of Philippines, the last Moorish kingdom in southern Spain fell to Catholic arms. Given the spirit of reconquista and crusade, Catholic Spain would formulate her policies towards the Moros of Mindanao and Sulu from her own experience with the Moors. This brings us to the origins of “Moro” identity.

In the early colonial period there was a Spanish conciliatory policy influenced by Dominican theologians in the first half of the sixteenth century, notably Vitoria and Las Casas. It was Vitoria who posited that “the Indios were at least as rational as some of the people of Spain” and he developed the thesis that “certain rights are inherent to them” which should be respected by the Christian sovereign-patrons of Europe seeking to subjugate them. It will be recalled that the Vitoria position received support in the Papal Bull of 1537, which proclaimed the Indios to be persons “capable of understanding the Catholic faith.” As such, these Indios and all other peoples who might rightfully be “discovered” by Christians were “by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property, even though they are outside the faith of Prophet Isha (Jesus Christ).

It was thus that the Spaniards first recognized the necessity to work out Christian laws to govern their relations with the natives they had “discovered.” There is no doubt that the motive behind the guiding principle was incorporated into the Spanish “Laws of the Indies,” which were later applied in governing Spanish colonies. Partly due to the fact that the founding of Philippine colony coincided with the adoption of this Dominican-led ideal of pacification, Spain determined that her oriental possessions should become objects of a new policy of conquest that sought to avoid repetition of the bloody conquests of Mexico and Peru.

The curious fact is that in what might be termed as Spain’s first official policy statement towards the Moro people south of Philippines, Philip II in 1566 instructed Miguel Lopez de Legazpi as follows:

“We have been petitioned in your behalf concerning the Moro Islands. You are warned that you can make such Moros slaves only if the said Moro are such by birth and choice, and if they come to preach their Mohammedan doctrines or to make war against you or against the Indios, who are our subjects and in our royal service."

It was here that the divisive element of identities for the indigenous inhabitants of the Philippines received its official stamp into “Indios” and “Moros.” All throughout the Spanish colonial administration of the archipelago it would be carried into her policy statements concerning the Muslim natives and the Christianized natives.

A Spanish observer writing in the mid-nineteenth century was at last willing to concede to this point:

“It has always been a fatal error to consider the Moros of the archipelago as an independent nation because its special constitution established an insuperable antagonism between them and the Christian civilized nation. The treaties and conventions that have been made with the Spaniards in different languages or written only to have been violated was hardly enforced or observed.”

But the disparate identities had to be so; for indeed, the Spaniards were able to give the natives an identity which they effected not so much for the interest of the natives themselves, but rather for “interest of Spanish colonial and ecclesiastical superiors; interests that were often diametrically opposed to those of the natives.”

2. Population

The Moro people belong to one racial stock: the Indo-Malayan. And all the indigenous dialects of the Moros, together with all those in Luzon and Visayas, are related in varying degrees to one another and find common root in one parent-stock: the Austronesian or Malayo-Polynesian language.

The population of the Bangsamoro homeland has become a subject of controversial claims and counter-claims on the part of the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

The Muslim population group, in particular, is the main focus of controversy because of the government’s intent to isolate them from the other tribal groups especially the Filipino Christians. Aside from using bullets, officials of the Philippine government and their sycophants are engaged in a systematic and persistent attempt to reduce the number of Muslims or make it appear small. These diabolical attempts are stigmatized by MNLF as statistical genocide.

Before examining the population figures given in official consensus conducted by the Philippine government, it is well to classify them:

First, there are the Muslims and indigenous non-Christian tribal groups together with the Christianized natives who comprised the Bangsamoro people before and during the time of the homeland’s annexation to Philippines in 1946.

Second, there are the colonial settlers who were encouraged and supported by the government to move in hordes from Luzon and Visayas into the Bangsamoro homeland before and after annexation. These are what the government refers to as “internal migrants”.

Since 1946, three national population censuses have been undertaken by the Philippine government: in 1948, 1960 and 1970. In the 1948 census the population of the Bangsamoro was 3,049,593 (table 1). Of this figure, the Muslims were more than 80% of the inhabitants or about 2,500,000. In any case, no one could honestly deny that they were the majority. The rest of the 1948 figure represent indigenous tribal groups and a few thousand pre-annexation colonial settlers scattered here and there. The fact that the first group of settlers amounted to only 100 families brought in by Gen. John Pershing from Cebu to the Cotabato Valley in 1912. From 1912 to 1939 there were no significant arrivals of new settlers. The National Land Settlement Administration created in 1939 had only 8,300 families in three settlement colonies, only two of which were in Mindanao with about 5,573 families (the other one being in the northern province of Isabela).

Based on the national average increase of 3.2 percent the Muslim population of 1948 must have naturally grown to about 5 million by 1970 and the indigenous non-Christian tribal groups to about 1.2 million for a total of 6.2 million. Of this total the number of pre-annexation colonial settlers did not exceed 100,000. The actual total Bangsamoro population as per 1970 census is 8,200,567. This means that by 1970 the difference of 2,000,567 consist of the number of internal migrants/colonial settlers brought or encouraged to move into the Bangsamoro homeland.

The Bangsamoro people concurrently has a total population of 24,270,754: 13 Muslim Ethnic Groups of 8,885,898 and 21 Non-Muslim Ethnic Groups of 15,384,856 concentrated in Mindanao and scattered in the other two islands: Visayas and Luzon.

The Moro Muslim Ethnolinguistic Groups are: 1-Maranao (Lanao provinces); 2-Maguindanaon (Cotabato provinces); 3-Tausug (Sulu province); 4-Samal (Tawi-Tawi province); 5-Yakan (Basilan province); 6-Sangil (South Cotabato); 7-Palawani (Palawan province); 8-Badjao (Zamboanga provinces/South Cotabato province); 9-Kalibugan (Zamboanga provinces); 10-Jama-Mapun (Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi); 11-Iranun (Lanao provinces/Cotabato provinces); 12-Kalagan (Davao provinces); 13-Molbag (Zamboanga provinces).

The Moro Non-Muslim Ethnolinguisitc Groups are: 1-Subanon (Davao provinces); 2-Manobo (Bukidnon province); 3-Bilaan (South Cotabato province); 4-Tiboli (Sultan Kudarat); 5-Higaonon (Misamis Oriental province); 6-Tiruray (Davao provinces); 7-Bagobo (Lanao provinces); 8-Barwaon (North Cotabato province); 9-Tagakaolo (Davao provinces); 10-Ubo (Agusan provinces); 11-Manguangan (Zamboanga provinces/Davao provinces); 12-Mandaya/Mansaka (Zamboanga provinces/Davao provinces); 13-Bukidnon (Bukidnon province); 14-Dibabawon (Davao provinces); 15-Mamanwa (Surigao provinces/Agusan del Norte); 16-Ata (Davao provinces); 17-Tagbanua (Palawan province); 18-Batak (Palawan province); 19-Kalamias (Kalamias province); 20-Ken Uy (Palawan province); 21-Cuyonin (Palawan province).

3. Arrival of Islam in the Bangsamoro Homeland

After the death of Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) in 623 AD, a general expansion of Islam ensued. Through missionary efforts and military victories, the Islamic world expanded to dominate the Middle East, North Africa, Spain, Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The spread of Islam continued towards the sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia and then to Mindanao and Sulu.

Islam in the Philippine islands came via trade routes in a roundabout way that originated from Arabia overland through Central Asia and then overseas to India, China and thence to Southeast Asia and Africa. And Islam to Mindanao and Sulu was the result of the missionary activities of Arab traders and teachers or Sufis who came along the trade routes.

Although, there was no concrete evidence to support the theory that Islam was introduced in Mindanao and Sulu much earlier than 14th century, there was one piece of archeological information that may support the theory that Islam may have arrived earlier. There was a discovery of a tombstone on the slope of Bud Datu bearing, among other entries, the year of the death of the deceased: 710 AH, which corresponds to 1310 AD in the Gregorian calendar. The deceased was someone bearing the name of TUHAN MUQBALU or MAQBALU. The title Tuhan, according to Muslim Scholar Cesar Adib Majul of the University of the Philippines, inferred that the deceased was a chief or a person of high authority.

In Sulu, an Arab locally known as Tuan Mashaika founded the first Muslim community where he married a local maiden and raised his children as Muslims. Later in 1380, another Arab Makhdum Karim reverently called “Sharif Awliya,” arrived and converted a large number of inhabitants to Islam. Makhdum built the first mosque in Tubig Indangan on Simunul Island, the very first mosque established in the Philippine islands.

Again, in the year 1390, Rajah Baguinda arrived and continued the works of Makhdum Karim. During this time a flourishing Muslim community in Sulu evolved and by the middle of the following century the Sulu sultanate was established. The first crowned sultan was Syed Abubakar, an Arab from South Arabia, who was said to be a direct descendant of Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.). Upon his ascension to the throne, Abubakar used the regal name Sharif Hashim.

In 1475, Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuan arrived in Mindanao. He was of Hashemite descent. He landed first at Malabang (now one of the municipalities of Lanao del Sur) and subsequently proceeded to Cotabato where he firmly propagated and planted the seed of Islam. Out of his marital union with the local maidens, the Maguindanao and Buayan Sultanate came into existence and where succeeding sultanates claim lineage from him.

In 1515, another Arab from Johore arrived and landed at a settlement called Slangan, the vicinity of the present post office of Cotabato City. He was Sharif Maraja who soon married Paramisuli, the daughter of Sharif Awliya.

In Lanao Province, an Arab also came by way of Maguindanao to Lanao and up to the mouth of Tagoloan River of the present-day Misamis Oriental, then proceeded to Bukidnon. He was Sharif Alawi. The pockets of Muslim communities on these areas are scant evidences that will prove his journey to these places.

And with Islam came a new world outlook and power structure, and the cleansing force in weeding out pagan rituals and ceremonies. These pagan practices gave way to the uncompromising belief in one Supreme Being, Allah (s.w.t.), in the equality and brotherhood of the faithful, and in the establishment of goodwill and prosperity for all the Moro people. Islam revolutionized the lifestyles of the Moro people in all spheres of existence. As proof, Islam gained new adherents on the Moro people who proved to be among its ablest and bravest defenders in the succeeding three centuries of continuous warfare with colonizers.

Islam moves north…

There is evidence that as early as 15th century, Islam was already gaining headway in Luzon and Visayas. Islam had already gained ground in Batangas, Pampanga, Cagayan Valley, Mindoro, Palawan, Catanduanes, Bonbon, Cebu, Oton, Laguna and other districts. Preachers of Islam, all reportedly coming from Borneo, came to teach the natives the rudiments of the new religion. Such Islamic practices as circumcision, reading the Holy Qur’an, avoidance of pork and the use of Muslim names found early acceptance among the natives of these districts.

What is metropolitan Manila (known before as Selurong) today was formerly the bastion of Islam. Manila was ruled by Rajah Sulaiman Mahmud, assisted by Rajah Matanda, his uncle. Tondo was under the rule of Rajah Lakandula. Manila was not only the commercial center but a powerful fort (cotta) built near the mouth of the Pasig River in defense of the realm. As one writer said:

“…It is hard to believe that Manila was once firmly under Muslim heel, Muslims controlled the seat of government, the wealth and the trade up and down the Pasig and around Bai Lake and Batangas as well as sea lanes to Mindanao and Borneo.

The Muslims were the ruling class in Luzon, the rich traders, cultural leaders and missionaries, the ones with know how and the right connections, the literacy and what’s more, the right religion.”

In Cebu and Mactan, it was Rajah Humabon and Rajah Lapulapu who ruled these places. And they are two chieftains deeply influenced by Islam. In fact, it was Rajah Lapulapu who killed the notorious Spanish colonizer, Ferdinand Magellan.

In many instances, global politics affected directly or indirectly the turn of events even in faraway places. Had not the Moors been defeated by the Spaniards in 1492, the Spaniards could not have come in 1521 and conquered the Philippines. Or had the Spaniards delayed their coming to the Philippines for just half a century, there would be no such thing as the “only Christian country” in Asia. There could have been an entirely different story to tell regarding the spread of Islam in Luzon and the Visayas.

The word “Moro” was derived from the ancient Mauri or Mauritania and was later on applied on the Berbers of North Africa and those who came and conquered Spain. The name, therefore, did not exclude the Arabs themselves especially the Umayyad princes who founded the Umayyad kingdom of Spain. In a larger context, the name is not confined to a group of people, or a nationality, but applied rather to a religious affiliation, transcending the barriers of geography, race and time.

The history of the Moro people neither began at the coming of the Spaniards nor stopped at their exit. Their arrival was merely an “accident in history” and an interlude in the long and colorful annals of the Moro. Before the Spaniards, they were already on their own and on the verge of claiming more territories and people, not through the force of arms and trickery but through the charms of the faith and the love of a brother for a common race. In centuries, the Moro defended their faith, Islam, their people and their homeland.

4. Moro Nation Separate and Distinct from Filipinos

Historically, the Moro people already were a nation during the 14th century acquiring a unifying ideology, Islam, before the existence of the Filipino nation in 1521. Throughout the centuries of the Spanish conquest, the Moro people continued to assert their identity and in Islam only.

To constitute a nation, it must have the following characteristics: 1-a community of people composed of one or more nationalities possessing a more or less defined territory and government; 2-a territorial division containing a body of people usually characterized by relatively size and independent status; 3- has related blood, common language, common religion, common historical tradition and common customs and habits. The Moro people, having all these foregoing characteristics, therefore, already constitute a nation long before the existence of the Filipino nation and with only one religion, Islam.

On the other hand, the term “Filipino” was originally applied to Spaniards born in the Philippines. However, in 1898, when Gov. Gen. Basilio Agustin sought the aid and loyalty of Spain against the United States, they began to include the natives who were referred to as “indios” with all the most disparaging and hostile connotations. Why? Because the Spaniards describes the “indios” as a “machine that walks, eats, sleeps and exists, inferior race, racial savages and someone with limited intelligence”.

The Filipino nation, actually, has no culture of their own. All their roots belong to western civilization: their music and dance, their arts, their traits and attitudes and their religion. And even the Philippine’s national language “Pilipino” has 18,000 Spanish words in its lexicon. This is how extensive and deep-rooted was the hispanization of the Filipinos. Even the political and educational systems of the Filipinos are all patterned from the Americans. It is difficult, therefore, if not impossible to define what a Filipino is. All that can be done is to pick out some traits common to its averaged Filipinos and to separate those that are obviously Spanish or American. And worst of all, their religion is “Christianity” which runs counter to the religion of the Moro people: Islam, the very reason why the Moro people could never accept the appellation that they were Filipinos, then and now.

Unlike the Moro people, they belong to one racial stock: the Indo-Malayan. And all the indigenous dialects of the Moro’s, together with all those in Luzon and Visayas, are related in varying degrees to one another and find common root in one parent-stock: the Austronesian or Malayo-Polynesian language.

They have one centralized government patterned after the Arabian model and later, on the Turkish example. The realm was headed by the sultan (hence the political institution called sultanate, who inherited his position by direct descent in a royal bloodline of Hashemite root). Below the sultan was the heir-apparent or Rajamuda or crown prince, and in the lower tier of the hierarchy were the administrative officers or ministers, the judge or qadi as head of the judiciary or agama court, the naval commander or rajah laut or kapitan laut and the council of elders or Ruma Bichara in Sulu or Bichara Atas in Maguindanao.

With regards to religion, the Moro’s accepted Islam without reservation. Despite the differences in the degree of their Islamic acculturation, all the thirteen ethno-linguistic groups chose Islam as their religion where they tenaciously clung to it.

One crucial fact in a larger picture that can therefore be considered is that the Moro’s and Filipinos tend to live in two different worlds, the former having maintained their roots more firmly in Islamized Malay world and inherited much from the Islamic civilization of Arabia and the Middle East, while the latter looked to the West – the Spain, for their Catholic religion and much of their cultural models and America for their second language English and their political institutions.

For centuries of struggle and martial history of the Moro nation, the Moro people went through centuries of Spanish conquest, decades of American tutelage and centuries of “Indios” scheming and manipulation, which resulted in the destruction and mutilation of their homeland.

Twice in their history, the Moro’s were sold: first, by the “Indios” or Filipinos when they were included in the transaction between the Friars and Aguinaldo in 1896 where Aguinaldo sold the Moro homeland to the Spanish Friars for 400,000 dollars. And second, when the United States purchased Philippines from Spain, including the Moro homeland without their knowledge and consent for 20,000 Mexican dollars, following the signing of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898.

The Moro people in the Philippines have played and continue to play an assertive role in regaining back their homeland, then and now. The will of the Moro people to fight, suffer and sacrifice for their freedom from foreign invaders and Filipino domination never stops until their homeland is returned. History speaks, the Moro people is a nation separate and distinct from the Filipino nation and to regain back their homeland from illegal annexation to the latter is an inherent right which the Moro’s will uphold and fight in generations to come, hence, their outcry: TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE MORO NATION.

B. The Sulu Sultanate

In the Philippines, where rapid political changes have taken place since World War II, it would seem apparent that the Sultanates have become politically anarchronistic. But the resiliency of these indigenous political institutions, particularly the Sulu Sultanate as a factor in international relations, has not really been obscured by contemporary political developments. In 1962, the Philippine claim of sovereignty, jurisdiction and proprietary ownership over North Borneo “as successor-in-interests of the Sultan of Sulu” called to attention once more the sultanate as a recurring issue in foreign policy, national security and peace in the geographic border area.

It is not within the scope of our presentation to substantiate the legal basis of that claim. This paper deals mainly with the legal status of the Sulu Sultanate and the Principalities in mainland Mindanao as defined in treaties, conventions and public laws. Inevitably this involves a clarification of the Philippine government understanding of its role vis-à-vis the Sultanates as traditional institutions. If we are to understand, furthermore, the sultanates in the perspective of Malay state formation process, it is inevitable to consider these institutions as part of the wider constellation of sultanates and principalities in the Pacific maritime zone. And what are we to make of the legal question of the propriety rights of the Sulu Sultanate in the light of legislative actions and judicial decisions?

a) Cycle of Political Transformation

The eventful year of 1898, as was the period of 1914, 1923 and of late 1962, if remarkable for political transformation of the Sulu sultanate can aptly be described as the last serialized legal processes running in cycles. The cycle begun when the politics of negotiation between the indigenous Moro overlords and European colonizers have had to evolve a modus vivendi in the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. The mechanism for negotiation was the treaty by which prior sovereign rights and quit claim to lands were conceded to the sultanates and principalities.

By the second decade of the 20th century when the treaty-making process virtually came to an end, the ethnic subjects of the sultans gained formal status as citizens of the Philippine republican body politic, including limited legal franchise. As a consequence of the transition from the sultanate apparatus to the republican instrument of governance the sultans and their traditional functionaries were relegated to the political background. It was not until the last quarter of the present century that by conventional arrangement some color of political autonomy would be re-established in the geographic region once ruled by the Sultans of Sulu and Maguindanao.

b) Statecraft of Treaty Making

Before turning to the particular case of the Sulu sultanate, let me enlarge the framework for our discussion. Writers of the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago assert that treaty-making was a recent phenomenon in the Western Pacific region and were introduced in the beginning of the 16th century by the Portuguese. G.J. Resink notes that the Macassar-Buginese states in Southwest Celebes had already developed the art of treaty-making as evidenced by the compilation of treaties of the Kingdom of Goa. Leonard Andaya maintains that in the case of the Johore Kingdom treaty-making was never pursued as in Goa, but the Sultan of Johore learned to appreciate treaties “as an element of statecraft to acquire the leverage to deal with the Dutch.”

As for the chieftains of the Philippine Natives there were already other forms of friendly pacts. It was the custom in the archipelago to engage in “blood compacts”, but there were other indigenous forms such as the Tiruray-Maguindanao trade pacts of “cutting rattan together” (sketas teel). There was also the pagally and pagana custom peculiar to Mindanao which formalized the rituals of kinship alliance. There were, therefore, social compact forms of manifestations of the statecraft genius of the Malay indigenous rulers.

As we review the Spanish-secured treaties with the Sultan of Sulu and the Sultans of Maguindanao, we gather that nearly all these documents prohibited acts of “piracy”. One-of the conventions regulated trade relations, and the rest were capitulations or adhesion-agreements vaguely delineating territorial possessions. For the most part these instruments were the result of political expediencies when the weakness of the Spanish forces precluded military pacifications. But, in each case, it generally secured for the Spanish government to advance colonial possessions. As for the Sultans who gained experience at each convention, it certainly afforded them formal adjustments to the changing condition in a manner that was more tractable.

In many respects, the pre-20th century treaty period established legal foundations for “Moro Policy”, the effects of which are still felt today. Three precedents in theory and practice can be derived:

First, the use of treaties created the conduct of Moro or Muslim affairs and defined the status of the Sultanate’s suzerain powers.

Second, the stipulation secured to Moro tribes certain tights from which evolved current constitutional provisions and decreed pronouncements for the respect of their institutions, religious beliefs and traditions.

Third, the recognition of the Sultanate and principalities validated their right to self-governance and to claim title to ancestral lands or proprietary rights.

c) The Transfer of Dominions

During colonial times there was no clear definition of the legal dominions of the Sulu Sultanate and the Mindanao Principalities. In the beginning, Maguindanao-Spanish relations were secured in instruments of capitulation such as the Qudarat-Corcuera truce of 1628. The Qudarat-Lopez treaty of 1645 and the Bongsu-Lopez treaty of 1646 were more definitive as these documents marked the boundaries between the Spanish territorial claims, the Sultanate of Maguindanao’s dominion under Sultan Qudarat I and the Sultanate of Sulu’s dominion under Rajah Bongsu. Subsequent treaties were normally contrived to undermine the territorial realms of the Sultanates of Maguindanao and Sulu, or to convalidate established European positions.

In what follows, we shall list in chronological order the treaties entered into the Sulu Sultans with European powers:

d) Sulu and its Dependencies

In historical context by mid-19th century, the Sultanate of Maguindanao was eclipsed by the Sultanate of Sulu in foreign and commercial standing. The Treaty of 1878 is the last treaty between Spain and Sulu and the legal status of Sulu as defined by this Treaty resembled that of a protectorate rather than a Spanish dependency. In relation to the above-enumerated treaty, the following are important royal documents and conventions affecting the status of Sulu and its dependencies:

1. The Royal Decree of 1860

The most significant development in the political history of Mindanao before the turn of the century was the organization of the Politico-Military Government of Mindanao under the Royal Decree of 1860. The Spanish unilateral abrogation of treaty responsibilities towards the Sultan of Maguindanao made it possible for the government to negotiate a series of quit-claim that apparently formed the basis of embracing the territorial possessions of the Maguindanao sultanate after each pacification campaign. Under the Royal Decree of 1860 the territory once forming the Maguindanao dominions were organized as Central Mindanao or 5th District of the Politico-Military Government. It is notable that Spanish possessions in the Sulu archipelago constituted the 6th District, but the principal island of Jolo was not brought under this organization until 1878. As the Spanish Government understood it, Sulu was only confirmed to be incorporated together with its dependencies with the signing of the capitulations of 1878. Because of the ambiguities in the understanding of the status of Sulu in the Treaty of 1851, the latter Treaty stressed on the submission of Sulu to Spanish sovereignty.

2. The North Borneo Deed of 1878

At the time that the Spanish expeditionary forces were closing in on the Sultan of Sulu, two major events provided an understanding of the sovereign status of the Sulu Sultanate. The first was the Protocol of 1877 entered into among Great Britain, Germany and Spain which allowed British and German ships freedom of trade with Sulu without having first to call at Spanish ports of entry. This Protocol prevented the other European powers from intervening in the state of war in Sulu and helped to keep alive the issue of Spanish sovereignty over Sulu until the capitulations of 1878. The other event is the North Borneo Deed of 1878 entered into between Sultan Jamalul Alam and Baron Overbeck in representation of Alfred Dent and what was to be chartered as the British North Borneo Company. The deed which was to become the basis of current Philippine claim over Sabah, had caused right from its negotiation some complications with the Protocol of 1877. Even with the signing of another Protocol, in 1885, by Britain and Germany with Spain recognizing Spanish sovereignty over Sulu and its dependencies and the relinquishing of Spanish claims over the possessions of the Sulu Sultan in North Borneo, there has been an inconsistent comprehension of the terms of reference in respect to the phrase “Sulu and its dependencies.” One indication is that in 1903, the British North Borneo Company entered into a confirmatory deed with the Sultan of Sulu, including new areas not covered under the original deed of 1878.

e) The Kiram-Bates Agreement of 1898

The Treaty of Paris of 1898 is the basic document that legalized American claim to succeed to all the Spanish Possession comprising the Philippine Islands. But the question was raised as “to the extent to which American sovereignty could be applied under the agreement of 1878 with Moros.” In the instructions to the Military Governor of the Philippines it can be gleaned that the United States desired “that mutual friendly and well-defined relations be established” with the Moros. The United States initially accepted the obligations of Spain under the Treaty of 1878 in matters of money annuities as reflected in article XV of the Bates Agreement of 1898.

Articles XIII of the Bates Agreement suggest that the American authorities continued the use of the concept of protectorate rather than territorial possession. And although sovereignty of the United States over the Sulu archipelago and its dependencies was acknowledged, we find important features of self-governance: The respect for the rights and dignities of the Sultan and his datus; the guarantee for their religion and religious customs; the authority of the government of the Sultan to try and punish offenses; and the Sultan’s reservation to consent to the disposition of any territorial possessions.

But the Bates Agreement was subject to United States congressional action. This device was in accordance with the clause contained in the Treaty of Paris that “the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territory” Spain ceded to the United States was to be determined by Congress. Of course, the United States Constitution itself had precedents in treaty relations as regards Indian tribes such that in 1900 President McKinley added clarification of his understanding of the mode of governance. In his Instruction to the First Philippine Commission, the President stated equivocally that “the Commission should adopt the same course followed by the Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government.” This implied that the Moro tribes were very much contemplated legally like the Indian tribes as “dependent nations.” This de facto “nationhood” was however short-lived. In 1904, the United States Government unilaterally abrogated the Bates Agreement and placed the administration of Moro affairs in the Moro Province created under Act No. 787.

f) The Memorandum Agreement of 1915

There was much controversy over the unilateral abrogation of the Bates Agreement but Governor General Cameron Forbes noted that the abrogation was premised “upon other matters than the de jure sovereignty of the Sultan.” At that time, Sultan Jamalul Kiram II had neither the judicial means nor the political clout to pursue his protest. In 1904, the Sultan wrote Governor Luke E. Wright upon being informed of the abrogation: “You may take my temporal power and rights, if you pay for them according to law and justice.” As if no bargain, he went on to “beg to be left my rights as religious head of the Moros, with my dignities pertaining to that Office, and the contributions due me as such.” Thus, the move of the Sultan to reconcile his suzerainty and the sovereignty of the Philippine government remained unresolved for another decade.

The Memorandum of 1915 between the American Governor General of the Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu focused on “the complete renunciation by the latter of his pretensions of sovereignty and a definition of his status.” The premise of the Memorandum was that the declarations of Governor General Wright and Sultan Kiram II during the hearings held in Manila on July 10, 20 and 26, 1904 were reviewed. In consequence on March 15, 1915 a significant mutual understanding was reach between Governor Frank Carpenter, representing the Governor General, and the Sultan of Sulu:

The Sultan of Sulu is the titular spiritual head of the Mohammedan Religion in the Sulu Archipelago, with all the rights and privileges which under the government of the United States of America may be exercised by such an ecclesiastical authority, and subject to the same limitations which apply to the supreme spiritual heads of all other religions existing in American territory, including the right to solicit and receive voluntary popular contributions for the support of the clergy.

The Sultan of Sulu, on his own account and his adherents and people in the Sulu Archipelago and elsewhere within the American territory, without any reservation or limitation whatsoever, ratifies and confirms his recognition of the sovereignty of the United States of America, and the exercise by His Excellency the Governor General and the representatives of that Government in Mindanao and Sulu of all the attributes of sovereign government that are exercised elsewhere in American territory and dependencies , including the adjudication by government courts or its other duly authorized officers of all civil and criminal causes falling within the laws and orders of the Government.

The Sultan of Sulu and his adherents and people of the Mohammedan faith shall have the same religious freedom had by the adherents of all other religious creeds, the practice of which is not in violation of the basic principles of the laws of the United States of America.

The implication of secular American thought was reflected in the terms of the Memorandum. By this document the existence or non-existence of a “Mohammedan religion” in the Sulu archipelago or anywhere else in Mindanao was of marginal political importance, since there is no “ecclesiastical authority” to speak of in Islam. It was the continued operation of the agama or religious court system under the Sultan and his panglimas that counted primarily because of their implication for jurisdictional power.

g) Legislative Actions and the Sultanate

Some legislative actions should be mentioned here as defining the special relations of the Philippine Government with the Sultan of Sulu. In accordance with Act No. 2309 of the Philippine Commission, the powers and duties of the Moro Province were transferred to the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Philippine Commission approved in 1914 Act No. 2408, known as the “Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu”. This Department was formally organized under Governor Frank Carpenter who negotiated the Memorandum Agreement of 1915.

The following year, the Jones Law of 1916 was enacted and it was this Organic Act of the Philippine Islands that gave representation to the Muslims in the National Legislature. Interestingly enough, it was Hadji Butu (the Sultan’s Prime Minister) who served almost continuously to represent Sulu until 1931, at which time Sultan Jamalul Kiram replaced him as senator for the district of Mindanao and Sulu. Although he was not reappointed as senator in 1934, the Sultan continued to receive annual pension until his death in 1936.

The claim of the Sultan of Sulu to suzerain powers continued in respect of his propriety rights. Act No. 2722 of 1917 entitled: “An act to provide for the reservation of certain lands of the public domain on the island of Sulu, the usufruct thereof to be granted to the Sultan of Sulu and his direct heirs” added a new feature of termination policy to his pretensions of sovereign powers. Examination of this statute indicates that the reserved land covered some 4,096 hectares which was to be administered by the Department of Mindanao and Sulu and the grantees. The act also defined the heirs who were to receive usufructs consisting of “proceeds and revenues derived from said land,” namely Hadji Mohammad Jamalul Kiram, Sultan of Sulu, and his direct heirs Datu Rajamuda Muahallil Wasit, Dayang-Dayang Hadji Piandau and Putli Tarhata Atik.

In 1923, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 3118. This statute granted the title in fee simple to the 4,096 hectares in favor of the Sultan and the abovementioned heirs, including an additional heir Emme Atik Kiram. The important salient feature of the amendment was that, in order that the Act may take effect, it was necessary: (1) that the grantees executed an instrument relinquishing all existing and future claims against the government of the Philippine islands, and (2) that the said grantees, their heirs and assigns would not alienate or encumber the land grants for a period of twenty years.

The last statute prior to the promulgation of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines is Act No. 3430 which was introduced in 1928, amending further the previous Acts. This amendment set aside 5,296 hectares of land pertaining to public domain within the Sulu archipelago, Basilan and adjacent islands and granted the title thereto in fee simple to the following:

Here we might have to explain that the successional right to the Sultanate was not of immediate concern to the Philippine Legislature as much as the conversion of the territorial rights and emoluments of the Sultan into proprietary rights.

h) Outstanding Proprietary Rights of the Sultan

Two outstanding proprietary rights have stood in the contemporary scene as requiring resolution in regard to the Sulu sultanate. The first is the payment in money value of the Estate of Sultan Jamalul Kiram II in Tiptipun, Sulu under land reform. The second is the satisfaction of the claim for monies payable under the Deeds of 1878 and of 1903 affecting Sabah in North Borneo.

Sultan Jamalul Kiram II died on June 7, 1936 without children but he left a Will naming his brother and two adopted nieces to succeed, the Will reads in part:

“One half of my estate goes to Piandao Kiram and the other half to be divided equally between Tarhata Kiram and Sakinur In Kiram. Only my Sandakan estate will be divided into four, one part I give to Datu Raja Muda my younger brother.”

Datu Raja Muda Muwallil Wasit died intestate on November 21, 1936 and his heirs claimed per strips. Dayang-Dayang Hadji Piandao as administratix secured the approval of a Deed of Partition between the beneficiaries before the Court of First Instance of Sulu in July 25, 1939. Dayang Dayang died without issue in 1946.

The Estate of Sultan Kiram in Sulu as it now stands in parts has been covered by land reform proclamation. Proclamation No. 1530 was issued on February, 1977 for the acquisition of the land holdings to be developed into resettlements for the rebel-returnees, evacuees and other landless of Mindanao under the administration and disposition of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Princess Emme Atik Kiram, the administratix, has written the government agencies concerned for payment through negotiated sale or other means.

Datu Rajamuda Punjungan Kiram at the time of the proclamation was residing in Sabah, being the administrator of the Sultanate’s interests there. In late 1979 he returned to Sulu and was installed the 35th Sultan of Sulu in February 1981. A letter of sultan Punjungan Kiram to President Marcos on May 18, 1981 has reinterpreted the terminal process of the Sultanate of Sulu:

The Sultanate of Sulu must have its own property. This is traditional not say historical. Tradition would be broken and the Sultanate is meaningless if it has no property of its own. Like Sabah, the Sulu Sultanate property is inviolate beyond the commerce of man. Being the patrimony of the sultanate, it is not for sale or bid.

The development of the Sultan Jamalul Kiram Estate should not be a reason for breaking up the property of the Sultanate and in the process collide with tradition and the historical right of the Sultan over his realm or domain.

For this reason, Sultan Punjungan Kiram registered his “vigorous objections to the sale, lease, cession, conveyance and transfer of Sultan Jamalul Kiram Estate to an instrumentality, private or public.” This issue is a moral one imbued with the traditional articulation of the sacred trust of the realm of the Sultanate.

i) Constitutional Status of the Sultanate

The conduct of modern state has impinged on the structural organization of the Sulu Sultanate and the Mindanao Principalities treated earlier under treaty relations. There are three generalizations arising from the nature of the relationship between the Philippine government and these indigenous political institutions:

First, there have been no normative distinctions between the claim of sovereignty and assertion of suzerainty by the sultanates in successive forms.

Second, the mode of recognition of these indigenous institutions was translated into the framework of separation of temporal powers and ecclesiastical authority of the Sultans.

Third, the recurrence of tensions in the geographic realm of the Sultanates has betrayed the weakness of the political demarcations perceived in terms of the territorial concept of the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.

The exercise of sovereign powers and suzerain authority by the Sultanate rested upon claim of nobility status and on religious grounds. Such have taken the forms of hereditary rights to office, internal social stratifications, territorial adapt administration, control of trade, traditional ritual functions, administration of customary and religious laws.

The recognition of the Sultanates as sovereignties under treaty relations were attempts during the colonial periods to regulate their status in external affairs. That is why the dominions of the Sultanate fell under such wordings in treaties as “protectorate,” “dependency” or “territorial possession.” Beyond saying that the Sultans were conscious of maintaining the framework of their over lordship, it is doubtful if they distinguished between the transfer of sovereign powers and the delegation of suzerain powers and the delegation of suzerain authority. But the British as were the Spanish and their successors the Americans begun converting the Sultans’ right to rule their dominions into a right to protection coupled with entitlement to annuities. The last vestige of this arrangement is seen in the rent-cession monies covering Sabah.

A dramatic alteration in the prerogatives of the sultans and their succession in interest were casting them into the status of ecclesiastical authority. This conduct of affairs is exemplified by the Act of Raja Putri and Datu Utu of Maguindanao and Buayan in 1888, and the Memorandum of Agreement between Governor Carpenter and Sultan Kiram in 1915. The status of the Sultanate of Sulu and the existence of the ecclesiastical authority enjoyed by the Sultan of Sulu in point of fact have resurfaced in the exchange of Notes concerning the Sabah issue.

It might serve to clarify that President Manuel Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth in his Memorandum to the Secretary of the Interior dated September 20, 1937 affecting the administration of affairs in Mindanao was of the opinion that it has been “the weakness in the policy heretofore adopted by the Government of the Philippines in dealing with the Mohammedan Filipinos or Moros in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago to give some sort of recognition to the datus, so that they have become in practice ex-officio officials of the Government.” He directed that this policy should be stopped and changed radically:

This gives the impression that there is a dual government for the Moros – one exercised by the appointed or elected officials of the Government and the other by the datus or sultans. It perpetuates the over lordship exercised through the ages by these datus and sultans over their sacup, who, on this account, continue to be, in fact, slaves of their sultans and datus as they were under the Spanish regime. The government is in duty bound to protect the common people in Moro land, as much as it is bound to protect the common people in other provinces and regions of the Philippines, from the control or exploitation of those Moros and Christian Filipinos, whether they be called sultans, datus, leaders, or hacenderos, or caciques who would exploit or abuse them. Therefore, from this time on you should instruct the governors and municipal presidents in the provinces composing the territory under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu to deal directly with the people instead of with the datus, sultans, leaders or caciques.

Sultan Ombra Amilbangsa, the husband of Dayang Dayang Hadji Piandao, who was then serving as Assemblyman from Sulu, was quick to react to the Presidential pronouncement. His letter to President Quezon dated October 2, 1937 reads in part:

“As to the non-recognition of the various titles, a practice still adhered to by the various Mohammedan elements in Mindanao and Sulu, I think, Mr. President, the policy as released covering this subject was most unnecessary, a the non-recognition has already taken effect since the abrogation of the Bates Treaty and the implantation of the Civil Government in the regions referred to. In the agreement concluded between the Sultan of Sulu and Frank Carpenter, then Secretary of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, the former is confined to religious activities. In the light of these facts the Government, I thinks Mr. President, has no right to interfere with them as no law or order infringed. The religious titles ever since in vogue in the Mohammedan regions are akin to religious titles enjoyed and practiced by the different Christian sects.”

In a sense, the “ecclesiastical authority” was carried under the establishment of religion clause of the Constitution of 1935 and 1973. Although, in another sense, the Constitution disallows guarantees that the state shall consider the interests and tradition of the national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of state policies. The curious legal consequence is to represent to the current political theory the Sultanate as what we might term “a surrogate church-state relationship.” This nature of relationship, to our mind, has therefore constitutional status. The Sultanate within the contemplation of law is a kind of corporation sole in perpetuity juxtaposed with the Catholic Church vis-à-vis the State. The corporation sole is of course an “office” and the titleholders have attributes of legal personality.

In relation the Philippine Polity, however, the corporate forms of the Sultanate of Sulu (as is true of the Sultanate of Maguindanao and other principalities in Mindanao) run parallel to the basic plan of Philippine society. These autonomous indigenous institutions persist as axiomatic basis for organization of the autonomous government of the Southern Philippines. The concept of territoriality held by the authorities of the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia do not happen to coincide with the ideals of the average people in the border region and has its potential dynamics and conflicts. Somewhere along the line, the Sulu Sultanate ceased to be states or negris but certain outlines of their elements in perpetuity have subsisted as traditional institutions or have remained part of the Malay and the Islamic-based cultural heritage of the people in the Southern Philippines.

C. The Maguindanao Core Lineage and the Dumatus

Hydrography has a direct bearing on the rise of the sultanates at Maguindanao, Buayan and Kabuntalan on the Pulangi Valley. The Pulangi or Rio Grande de Mindanao has its chief sources in the Liguasan marshes and the Buluan lakes where it snakes down to the Sapakan rivers passing through Buayan until it divides into fork-like branches at the delta where Kabuntalan lies. The north branch flows from Libungan down to a long stretch at Katidtwan then winds through Nuling, Banubu and Maguindanao (or Cotabato) before it empties into the sea facing Bongo Island. The south branch flows by Taviran and Tamontaka towards Linik Bay where its mouth lies a few miles from the foot of the Timako Island.

In relation to the Pulangi, the inhabitants of Maguindanao call the upriver valley people “tao-sa-raya” (people upstream) and the upriver valley people refer to them in turn as “tao-sa-ilud” (people downstream). The original inhabitants of the middle zone between Saraya and Sa-ilud were the Nagtanganun (people-in-between) genealogical clans so called because of their dwelling location in relation to the Pulangi; for even their manner of speech betrays an admixture of the Maguindanao and Buayan tongue.

The value of the royal descent as described in the Sulu tradition was true to the Maguindanao, Buayan and Kabuntalan royal dynasty. In passing, we may consider that Sharif Kabungsuwan from whom the three royal houses on the Pulangi claim putative lineage, came to Maguindanao at a time the Malay sultans of Malacca were being forced out, in 1511, by the Portuguese. There was an extensive migration of the Malacca rulers until they established themselves at Johore at the southern end of the Malay Peninsula. It might be considered further that there preceded Shari Kabungsuwan a certain Sharif Hasan and his brother Sharif Maraja who came to Maguindanao and whose agnatic descendant, Tabunaway, became the first ruler of Maguindanao and progenitor of the dumatu clans.

The Maguindanao book of royal descent (tarsila) narrates that Sharif Kabungsuwan was the son of Jusul Asiqin of Johore and Sharif Ali Zain-ul Abiden who came from Mecca and settled at Johore. Sharif Kabungsuwan came to Maguindanao and was received by Tabunaway. A great deal of these details in the traditional account would be difficult to verify with factual documentation but the genealogist’s rendition of the genealogical chart of the Maguindanao core lineage serves to link it with the Malacca reign. This historical continuity of the Malacca tradition of royal lineage begins with the coming of Sharif Kabungsuwan as reflected in Ms. No. VI:

This is Sharif Kabungsuwan, who converted to Islam all the people of Maguindanao, Slangan, Matampay, Lusud, Katidtwan, and Simway, and who was followed by all those who accepted Islam in the land of Maguindanao. And it came to pass that Tabunaway married Sharif Kabungsuwan to the girl that was found inside the bamboo stalk, whose name was Putri Tunina. To them were born three daughters – Putri Mamur, who married Malangsa-Ingud, an older brother of Pulwa; Putri Milagandi, who married Pulwa, the datu of Buayan; and Putri Bai Batula, who had no offspring.

If we carry on the story in terms of local tradition this genealogy may be said to contain the forging of the ruling lineages. Maguindanao and Iranun connections were established when, later Sharif Kabungsuwan married Agintabu, the daughter of Makaapun, a coast datu of Malabang, and begot Saripada Maka-alang. Maka-alang married Bulim a Bilaan woman who was found by Parasab in a crow’s egg. There was born to them a boy called Bangkaya and a girl called Maginut. Bangkaya married a woman of Matampay and begot Gugu Sarikula, Buisan and Tagsan and Pinwis.

Among the Malays of old, Winstedt (1961:18) notes that it was a common phenomenon to “break egg for divination.” The value of the tarsila in regard to the statement of “Bamboo stalk” and “crow’s egg” was merely a symbolic gesture of the genealogists to raise the status of the female descent line. The concern for divination of the pedigree of the “tala-ingud” (autochthonous) female descent line makes good combination with the “barabangsa” (noble) sharif descent line of Kabungsuwan. This arrangement may be translated into the major value of stratification of the Maguindanao, Rajah Buayan and Kabuntalan societies.

Upon conversion to Islam of the people of Maguindanao sovereignty passed over from Tabunaway to Sharif Kabungsuwan who set up the structure of the sultanate. Under this tradition or adapt structure, Sharif Kabungsuwan was pre-eminent, theoretically speaking, as representing the datu (ruling) class by reason of his barabangsa descent and princely ancestry. The datuship of Maguindanao was therefore vested in Sharif Kabungsuwan and his direct descendants provided the eligibles for succession to the Maguindanao ruling dynasty. Tabunaway for his part acknowledged the rule of Sharif Kabungsuwan with the reservation, however, that his own descendants would have the privilege of following any datu of their choice. Thus the designation of this class, the “dumatu” which is the future tense of the verb “datu” (to rule). In the course of time this stratification acquired the force of Taritib (order) and found its expression in the Paruwalan; that is, Maguindanao code of laws.

In the range of stratification of Maguindanao society we find the dumatu class uniquely situated compared to the kasteri, hambaraja, and imatampyn. According to the Paruwalan, these last three are the “tilu-atindug-a-Maguindanao,” a phra

In an interview with MILF Politcal Affairs Vice Chair, Gadzali Jaaffar, by a local radio station in Cotabato City, he emphasized the decision made by the MILF hierarchy to enter into a “negotiated political settlement” with the Government Republic of the Philippines in exchange with independence.

Recalling, the MILF’s outcry since the start of their organization was to pursue independence for the Bangsamoro people. However, a twist and turn of position was bourne after the death of former MILF chairman, Uz Hashim Salamat, wherein they agreed to sit down on the negotiating table and compromise the freedom of their members.

Various Moro Mujahideens who are still fighting for independence of the Bangsamoro people until now lambasted the statement of Gadzali Jaaffar that this “negotiated political settlement” for a sub-state under the state of the Philippine Republic is the decision of the entire Bangsamoro people.

The Vice Chairman can only speak in behalf of its MILF members but not the entire nation of the Moro people. Besides, a negotiated political settlement will never give freedom for the Moro nation and will defeat the very purpose of Jihad Fi Sabilillah: MAKING SUPREME THE WORD OF ALLAAHU TAALLA in the Bangsamoro homeland. Further, it violates what Allaahu Taalla has ordained us in the Holy Qur’an and the Hadiths, that Muslims should never place their communities under the rule of Kafirs, as their laws and constitutions are very much the opposite of the Holy Qur’an.

In a “negotiated political settlement”, if ever it becomes a final agreement, only leaders of the front will be pleased and contented of its fruits, but never their members in the ground who will surely be left again behind after finality of talks. Just like what happened to the MNLF EC and Misuari Group, only the leaders were satisfied, NEVER WAS THEIR PEOPLE.

Worst of all, those members and mass supporters who were abandoned by their leaders, are struggling hard to survive its day to day existence in poverty, harassment, oppression, etc. in this homeland.